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2 
 
 Corporate Governance Disclosure Index–Executive Pay Nexus: The Moderating Effect of 
Governance Mechanisms 
 
This paper first employs principal component analysis technique to develop and introduce an alternative 
UK corporate governance disclosure index to the US-centric ones.  Second, we then investigate whether 
this new corporate governance disclosure index can determine the level of executive pay (including CEOs, 
CFOs, and all executive directors) in UK listed firms, and consequently ascertain whether the governance 
mechanisms can moderate the pay-for-performance sensitivity. Employing data on corporate governance, 
executive pay and performance from 2008 to 2013, we find that, on average, better-governed firms, tend 
to pay their executives lower compared with their poorly-governed counterparts. Additionally, our 
findings suggest that the pay-for-performance sensitivity is generally positive, but improves in firms with 
high corporate governance quality, implying that the pay-for-performance sensitivity is contingent on the 
quality of internal governance structures. We interpret our findings within the predictions of optimal 
contracting theory and managerial power hypothesis. 
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Introduction 
The agency theoretic literature has suggested several monitoring (e.g., good corporate governance 
practices)  and incentive alignment (e.g., executive pay packages) mechanisms that can be employed to 
mitigate agency conflicts in modern corporations (Beatty and Zajac 1994; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen 
1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Noticeably, studies examining the extent to which executive pay 
packages can be used to mitigate agency problems in public corporations are underpinned by two main 
theoretical perspectives with deep roots in rational agency theory: (i) managerial power hypothesis; and 
(ii) optimal contracting theory (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Mallin et al., 2015; van 
Essen et al., 2015). Briefly, the managerial power hypothesis assumes that in firms with weak corporate 
governance structures, opportunistic and powerful corporate executives directly determine their own pay 
packages by controlling the executive pay setting process (Bebchuk et al., 2002), and thus the managerial 
power hypothesis does not expect executive pay to be necessarily related to corporate performance. 
Managerial power hypothesis can, therefore, be more applicable under a poor corporate governance 
regime. By contrast, the optimal contracting theory suggests that executive pay results from arms-length 
negotiations between independent corporate boards and managers, leading to executive pay packages that 
are able to optimise managerial performance (Conyon, 2014; Edmans and Gabaix, 2009), and therefore 
the optimal contracting theory expects a strong pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS). Hence, the optimal 
contracting theory can be expected to operate better under a good corporate governance condition. 
Due to varied reasons underlying executive pay, Amzaleg et al. (2014), Core et al. (1999, 2003), 
Murphy (1999), Newton (2015), and Sapp (2008), amongst others, have strived to investigate its 
determinants. However, the existing literature suffers from a number of observable limitations. First, 
despite the importance of good corporate governance practices and the considerable amount of corporate 
governance reforms that have been pursued worldwide (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004), existing 
literature, such as Amzaleg et al. (2014), Conyon and Murphy (2000), and Ozkan (2011), has almost 
focused exclusively on how or whether executive pay can be influenced by corporate performance/PPS, 
but performance is arguably only one possible determinant of executive pay. In contrast, few studies, such 
as those conducted by Adams and Ferreira (2009), Conyon (1997), Dong and Ozkan (2008) and Ozkan 
(2011), have examined whether and how firm-level corporate governance structures may influence 
executive pay, and thereby limiting current understanding of the effect of good corporate governance 
practices on executive pay. 
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Second, from a theoretical and practitioner point of view, corporate governance is important in 
corporate decision-making and thus, should and is expected to influence corporate outcomes (Foss and 
Stea, 2014; Larcker et al., 2007). Indeed, this expectation is reflected in the large volume of studies that 
have investigated the effect of different corporate governance mechanisms on different managerial 
behaviour and corporate outcomes (e.g., Donadelli et al., 2014; Gompers et al., 2003; Granado-Peiró and 
López-Gracia, 2017; Morck et al., 1988; Murphy, 1999; Serra et al., 2016; Yermack, 1996). However and 
as corporate governance is a complex ‘concept’ to operationalise, existing studies have either mostly 
employed single corporate governance mechanisms, such as board size and ownership structure (e.g., 
Morck et al., 1988; Yermack, 1996) or some form of arbitrarily constructed composite governance 
disclosure indices (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 2003; Karpoff et al., 2016). Observably, 
and despite a general consensus on its importance, the findings of a vast majority of existing governance 
studies are mixed, and thereby raising major questions as to whether these governance ‘constructs’ that 
are often employed are actually ‘valid’ proxies (single governance structures or governance disclosure 
indices) for the complex concept (‘governance’) that they seek to measure (‘construct validity’) (Black et 
al., 2016). On the one hand, Larcker et al. (2007, p.964) argue that the potential measurement error that 
may be introduced from employing the use of single governance mechanisms (e.g., board size), “will 
almost certainly cause the regression coefficients to be inconsistent”.  
On the other hand, other researchers have sought to address the measurement error issue by 
constructing governance indices that contain multiple provisions. There are, however, three major 
problems associated with such indices. First, and because there is no theoretical basis for selecting 
governance provisions, such indices are often naively constructed (Brown and Caylor, 2006), and thereby 
equally resulting in similar measurement errors (Black et al., 2016; Larcker et al., 2007). Second, it is not 
only practically impossible to include all relevant governance provisions, but also likely that not all the 
included provisions will be relevant, and therefore measurement problems, such as omitted variables bias 
are likely to persist in such governance indices (Black et al., 2016; Karpoff et al., 2016; Larcker et al., 
2007).1  Consequently, a small, but gradually increasing number of researchers have recently employed 
                                                          
1For example, Gompers et al. (2003) constructed an influential equally weighted governance disclosure index (‘G-
index) that contained 24 US shareholder rights provisions and showed that firms with poor governance had lower 
operating profits, market valuation and stock returns compared with their better-governed counterparts. However, 
successive researchers, such as Cremers and Nair (2005), Bebchuk et al. (2009) and Karpoff et al. (2016) have 
demonstrated that only six (entrenchment-index, E-index), eighteen (other-index, O-index), and twelve (deterrent-
index, D-index) of the 24 governance items, respectively, are relevant and often not just contradicting the findings of 
Gompers et al. (2003), but also among themselves. In addition, these indices are generally for US firms with no 
alternative (there are few commercial agencies, such as Governance Metric International, Institute of Shareholder 
Service, Credit Lyonnais Securities, and Standard & Poors, that construct commercial indices for sale, but they are 
often copyrighted and not freely available) indices for other countries, such as the UK. 
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statistical approaches in developing more reliable governance indices (e.g., Black et al., 2016 Karpoff et 
al.,2016;Larcker et al., 2007).  Larcker et al. (2007), for example, employ principal component analysis 
to develop an alternative disclosure index containing 14 key components out of 39 governance provisions 
for US firms, and they demonstrate that it is more reliable and better specified compared with previous 
ones, such as the G-disclosure index. We thus employ the principal component analysis approach to 
develop an alternative corporate governance disclosure index for UK firms. 
Third and despite increasing anecdotal evidence suggesting that other corporate executives below 
the CEOs, such as CFOs pay packages are getting equally significant in magnitude, existing studies have 
mainly investigated the antecedents of CEO pay (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Fahlenbrach, 2009; 
Core et al., 1999; Dong and Ozkan, 2008; Gregory-Smith, 2012; Guest, 2009; Jouber and Fakhfakh, 
2012), and thereby relatively little is known about the impact of firm-level corporate governance on the 
pay packages of other executives, such as CFOs and all other executive directors.  
Fourth, the existing studies that have investigated the executive pay-performance nexus generally 
suggest that the relationship is positive, but weak (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Main et al., 1996). 
However, a major limitation of these studies is that they only control for a small number of corporate 
governance variables that may affect the PPS. In response to this limitation, the more recent and 
subsequent studies have controlled for a large number of corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., 
including board and ownership structure), when examining the link between executive pay and corporate 
performance (e.g., Conyon, 1997; Core et al., 1999; Dong and Ozkan, 2008; Gregory‐Smith, 2012; Guest, 
2009; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Jouber and Fakhfakh, 2012; Ozkan, 2011). However, and despite 
controlling for a large set of corporate governance variables, these studies report similar positive and 
weak PPS. An observable limitation of these studies is that they do not sufficiently consider possible 
endogeneity concerns that may result from simultaneously employing both the incentive alignment 
(executive pay) and monitoring mechanisms (corporate governance) by firms to reduce agency conflicts 
(Ntim et al., 2015a, b). Arguably, this may explain the observably weak PPS reported by past studies and 
may also limit current understanding of the extent to which firm-level corporate governance quality can 
moderate the link between executive pay and firm performance. Finally, and despite the theoretical and 
empirical suggestions that most corporate decisions, including executive pay is mainly a function of top 
management team and ownership structure (Ntim et al., 2015a, b), there is a clear dearth of studies 
examining how board structure, CEO power and ownership structure variables may affect executive pay. 
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Arguably, this also limits our understanding of the extent to which board structure, CEO power and 
ownership mechanisms can impact executive pay. 
Given these noticeable weaknesses of the extant literature, we seek to investigate the impact of firm-
level corporate governance on executive pay and the PPS among UK listed firms. There are number of 
reasons, which motivated us to focus on the UK corporate setting. First, since 1992, the UK has been at 
the forefront of pursuing arguably the most influential global corporate governance reforms (Greenbury 
Report, 1995; Hampel Report, 1998; DRR, 2002; Higgs and Smith Reports, 2003; FRC, 2010a, b, 2012a, 
b). For example, most countries around the world have adopted the recommendations of the 1992 Cadbury 
Report, and intergovernmental organisations, such as World Bank, have also issued guidelines and 
principles, which reflect the content of the UK corporate governance codes.  Thus, the findings2 of our 
study may not only be relevant to the UK, but also to other countries, which are currently pursuing 
corporate governance reforms around the world. Second, the UK has strong shareholder activism with a 
good track record of implementing and enforcing corporate regulations. Third, the markets for products, 
services, capital, managerial and corporate control are fairly active, and thereby serving as an effective 
external corporate governance mechanism that can restrain executive abuse. Arguably, these contextual 
characteristics make the UK an ideal corporate environment to examine the impact of corporate 
governance practices on executive pay and the PPS. 
This study, therefore, seeks to extend, as well as make a number of new contributions to the growing 
body of literature on the antecedents of executive pay. First, it contributes to the literature by employing 
a principal component analysis technique to develop and introduce a new alternative governance 
disclosure index containing 31 key components out of 120 comprehensive governance provisions from 
the UK Combined Code for UK firms and researchers. Second, it contributes to the extant literature by 
examining the impact of a broad corporate governance disclosure index on executive pay. Third, we 
contribute to the existing literature by providing evidence on the extent to which board structure (i.e., 
board size and diversity), CEO power (i.e., CEO tenure, CEO duality and CEO pay slice), and ownership 
structure (i.e., managerial, institutional and block ownership) can explain differences in executive pay. 
                                                          
2We note that although the recommendations of the 1992 Cadbury Report have been adopted worldwide, the UK has 
different economic system and characteristics compared to not only developing countries that adopted the code, but 
also to other developed countries. For example, the markets for products, services and corporate control are more 
active in the US than UK, and this due to the fact that competition in the UK is tightly controlled by the Competition 
and Markets Authority. Further, shareholder activisim is stronger in US. In contrast, stakeholder activisim (i.e., 
general public outrage and activism) is much stronger in the UK. Additionaly, firms in civil law countries (e.g., 
Germany, France) are characteristised by weak protection of minority shareholders compared with firms in common 
law countries (e.g., UK and Ireland). Therefore, our results should be interpreted with great caution because there are 
apparent differences even among developed countries.  
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Fourth, this study contributes to the literature by providing new evidence on how corporate governance 
can impact on the annual cash (i.e., bonus, salary, and other cash payments) and equity-based (i.e., 
performance share plan and any other long-term incentive plans) pay of CEOs, CFOs and all other 
executive directors. Finally, given that directors’ incentives and corporate governance mechanisms may 
act either as complements and/or substitutes, it distinctively seeks to contribute to the existing literature 
by investigating whether corporate governance can moderate the PPS. We employ traditional ordinary 
least squares regressions in addition to lagged-effects, fixed-effects, GMM and Heckman selection bias 
regression techniques in testing the robustnesses of our contributions.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses corporate governance and 
executive pay policy reforms that have been pursued in the UK. Section 3 reviews related literature and 
develops hypotheses. The research design is described in section 4, while empirical findings are discussed 
in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
Corporate governance, executive pay and the UK corporate context 
The need to improve corporate governance practices in the UK increased since the late 1980s, and 
particularly after the occurrence of a series of major corporate failures, such as the collapse of Britain's 
Barings Bank (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). This period was discernibly characterised by poor 
transparency, accountability, performance and excessive executive pay (Conyon and Mallin, 1997; Pass, 
2006; Pye, 2000). Consequently, and since the early 1990s, several legislations and reports have been 
introduced aimed at promoting high standards of corporate governance by enhancing accountability and 
transparency among UK listed firms. For example, the Cadbury Committee was established in 1991 and 
issued its final report in 1992. The report included recommendations relating to board structures, financial 
reporting, auditing and internal controls. With specific regard to executive pay, the Cadbury Report 
required every listed firm to establish a remuneration committee with a majority of its members being 
unaffiliated directors, including the chairman of the committee. The report also recommends UK listed 
firms to disclose more information relating to the total payments made to the chairperson/highest-paid 
director. However, a key limitation of the Cadbury Report is that it focused mainly on the financial aspects 
of corporate governance and neglected other equally important aspects of governance, including the 
disclosure of detailed pay packages of each director (Conyon and Sadler, 2010; Dong and Ozkan, 2008). 
To overcome the limitations of the Cadbury Report, as well as to reduce the widespread public 
concerns about excessive executive pay in UK listed firms, the Greenbury Report was issued in 1995. 
The report aimed at addressing issues relating to executive pay in UK listed firms with specific focus on 
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enhancing the link between executive pay and performance through increased disclosures relating to 
executive pay. Also, the Greenbury Report recommended that every listed UK firm need to establish a 
remuneration committee, comprising exclusively of independent outside directors with its chairperson 
also being an independent non-executive director. The remuneration committee should also have terms 
of reference specifying its function, including determining the pay package for each director. 
Additionally, and unlike the Cadbury Report, the Greenbury Report suggested that the pay of senior 
executives should be set by the board as a whole and senior executives should not play any part in deciding 
their own remuneration. Similarly, the report suggested that the remuneration committee may invite CEOs 
to attend its meetings, and CEOs may help remuneration committees in setting the pay of other executive 
directors, but should not play any part in decisions concerning their own remuneration.    
Another crucial improvement on the Cadbury Report is that the Greenbury Report required UK 
listed firms to disclose additional information on the pay packages of each executive director (e.g., fees, 
bonuses, salaries, benefits in-kind, long-term incentive plans and any other benefit) in the annual report. 
The report also recommended that firms should disclose their core philosophy and rational underlying 
their executive pay packages. Further, the Greenbury Report suggested that shareholders, particularly 
institutional ones, should play an active role in determining executive pay. Additionally, the Greenbury 
Report emphasised the crucial role of institutional shareholders in determining executive pay by 
mandating the so-called (‘say-on-pay’) votes, as well as by requiring that the chairman of the 
remuneration committee should be available for consultations with major shareholders and strive to 
answer any of their questions/concerns.  
The corporate governance recommendations contained in Cadbury and Greenbury Reports were 
then consolidated in the Hampel Report (1998), permitting its committee to issue the first UK Combined 
Code in 1998. Additionally, and in order to increase disclosure and transparency about EP, the “Directors’ 
Remuneration Report” (DRR) regulations were published in 2002, as amendment to the 1985 Companies 
Act, and were subsequently incorporated into the 2006 Companies Act. The DRR required listed firms to 
make significant disclosures, including disclosing information about remuneration consultants, executive 
service contracts and remuneration policy (Conyon et al., 2009; DRR, 2002). Additionally, and similar to 
the Greenbury Report’s recommendations, the DRR also encouraged greater activism among shareholders 
by mandating the vote on executives’ pay (“say-on-pay”). The requirement of shareholders to be more 
active in determining executive pay has also been emphasised in the 2006 Companies Act (section 439), 
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Combined Codes (1998, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016) and the stewardship codes (2010, 
2012) with specific focus on institutional shareholders. 
In addition to the above recommendations, corporate governance provisions relating to the executive 
pay section in the Combined Codes (2003, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016) indicate that 
executives should be paid sufficiently in order  to attract, retain and encourage them to perform their roles 
to the best of their abilities. These codes also recommend that the pay package of executives should 
consist of a fair mix of both cash and equity-based pay. Furthermore, these codes suggest that high 
proportions of executive pay should be linked to performance. It should be acknowledged that, although 
complying with the executive pay reforms contained in all of the above mentioned reports and codes is 
voluntary, they have been added to the London Stock Exchange’s (LSE) listing rules,  and thereby  making 
it difficult to be ignored by UK listed firms (LR. 9.8.6R, 5–6). 
Apart from pursing the recent corporate governance reforms, which have aimed at promoting high 
corporate governance standards among UK listed firms, ownership is relatively highly dispersed, where 
institutional shareholders play a crucial role in overseeing and preventing management from expropriating 
shareholder wealth (Mallin et al., 2015). The combination of dispersed ownership structure with strong 
shareholder activism and good record of adopting and imposing corporate regulations (Filatotchev and 
Dotsenko, 2015; Melis et al., 2015) has helped in strengthening the markets for capital, product, services, 
managerial and corporate control in the UK. Consequently, this may help in reducing a number of agency 
problems, including excessive executive pay (Mallin et al., 2015; Newton, 2015). We, therefore, seek to 
examine whether corporate governance matters in determining executive pay in UK listed firms and 
consequently, ascertain whether corporate governance moderates the PPS. 
  
Literature review and hypotheses development 
A broad corporate governance disclosure index and executive pay 
Prior literature on executive pay has mainly used two perspectives of agency theory: (i) managerial 
power hypothesis; and (ii) optimal contracting theory (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Edmans and Gabaix, 2009; 
Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Optimal contracting theory suggests that in firms with good corporate 
governance mechanisms, executive pay packages can be designed in a way that helps to align 
management and shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this case, optimal contracting 
theory is more applicable when governance structures are effective. On the other hand, managerial power 
hypothesis suggests that in firms with poor corporate governance structures, opportunistic executives can 
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expropriate corporate resources by having the power to set their own pay (Choe et al., 2014; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Hence, managerial power hypothesis works better under a poor governance regime.  
Existing empirical literature examining the effect of corporate governance disclosure indices on 
executive pay are rare and therefore, offers opportunities to make original contribution to the literature. 
However, prior research suggests that corporate governance disclosure indices impact positively on 
performance/market value (e.g., Beekes and Brown, 2006; Beiner et al., 2006; Gompers et al., 2003; Ntim 
et al., 2012). Therefore, and to the extent that better-governed firms generate higher performance than 
their poorly-governed counterparts, we will expect firms with high good corporate governance disclosure 
index scores to be better placed to constrain excessive executive pay. Indeed, Jouber and Fakhfakh (2012) 
and Newton (2015) offer rare recent evidence in support of our proposition. Fahlenbrach (2009), for 
example, examined the effect of the Gompers et al. (2003)’s corporate governance disclosure index on 
executive pay for a sample of 11,029 US CEOs. His results suggest that well-governed companies: (i) 
have stronger PPS compared with poorly-governed companies; and (ii) pay their CEOs relatively less. 
This result implies that good corporate governance practices influence not just the levels of executive pay, 
but also the structure of their pay. Jouber and Fakhfakh (2012) and Newton (2015) have reported largely 
similar findings for UK and US listed companies, respectively. Thus, and in line with the objectives of 
the considerable corporate governance reforms (e.g., 1992 Cadbury Report and 2010 Combined Code) 
that have been pursued in the UK over the past 30 years, we expect that in firms with strong corporate 
governance structures, executives will have less influence over their own remuneration and, hence the 
first hypothesis to be tested is that: 
Hypothesis 1. There is a negative association between firm-level corporate governance 
disclosure index score and executive pay.  
 
Board structure and executive pay 
Corporate boards are argued to play crucial roles in terms of monitoring, controlling and setting pay 
for managers that ensures that they act in the best interest of shareholders (Jensen, 1993; Ozkan, 2007). 
However, the ability of a corporate board to conduct its duties effectively can be influenced by the way it 
is structured (e.g., diversity and size) (Ntim et al., 2015a. b; Ntim et al., 2017). Thus, and in our study, we 
examine the effect of these two board structures (board size and diversity) on executive pay. Theoretically, 
and in terms of board size, it is argued that poor governance is often associated with larger boards, since 
larger boards tend to be associated with more communication and coordination problems that can impair 
their effectiveness (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Yermack, 1996).  The weak monitoring can lead to managers 
rewarding themselves with overly generous pay packages (Ntim et al., 2015a, b; Ozkan, 2007). In 
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contrast, it is argued that larger boards are more effective in monitoring and controlling the opportunistic 
behaviours of management. This is because larger boards are often associated with more expertise and 
experience, which can restrain the influence that managers may have over board decisions, and thereby 
allowing the board to design pay packages that may be more closely aligned with executive performance 
(Edmans and Gabaix, 2009; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
With reference to board diversity, in this study, we focus mainly on examining the impact of both 
gender and ethnic diversity aspects of a corporate board on executive pay. This is due to two main reasons: 
(i) these two aspects can be observed and measured easily (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), and (ii) these two 
aspects have been widely investigated (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gregory-Smith et al., 2014). 
Theoretically, board diversity can increase managers’ power and influence over board decisions, 
including those relating to the level and structure of executive pay, by appointing few women and ethnic 
minorities mainly for symbolic reasons (Gyapong et al., 2016). By contrast, it is suggested that board 
diversity can play a crucial role in improving board effectiveness, including preventing management from 
expropriating shareholders’ wealth by increasing managerial monitoring and also by brining diverse 
perspectives, knowledge, experience and ideas to the board (Adam and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2003).  
The empirical evidence relating to the effect of board structures on executive pay are generally 
limited and therefore, this offers a fertile area for further research. For example, Guest (2009), Main 
(1991) and Ozkan (2007) report that firms with larger boards in the UK pay their CEOs higher than their 
counterparts with smaller boards. In terms of board diversity, the empirical evidence of prior studies 
suggests that board gender and ethnic diversity can enhance board independence and effectiveness by 
increasing monitoring on the opportunistic behaviours of management. For example, Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) and Gregory-Smith et al (2014) find a negative association between board gender diversity and 
CEO pay for US and UK firms, respectively. Therefore, our second hypothesis to be tested is that: 
Hypothesis 2. There is an association between board structure and executive pay. 
 
CEO power and executive pay 
 
CEO power is considered to be an important element that can influence board effectiveness 
(Bebchuk et al., 2011; Tian and Yang, 2014). Managerial power hypothesis suggests that firms with 
powerful CEOs, represented by high CEOs pay slice, long-tenure and role duality, tend to pay their 
executives more than necessary compared with firms with less powerful CEOs (Conyon and He, 2012). 
Specficially, and from managerial power hypothesis, CEO tenure is considered harmful, and this can be 
explained by the view that long-tenured CEOs tend to develop strong relationships with other board 
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members (Bebchuk et al., 2009; Ozkan, 2011), which can increase their power and influence over board 
strategic decision (i.e., pay setting process). Similarly, optimal contracting theory suggests that long-
tenured CEOs usually tend to have greater external networks, skills and experience, which firms need to 
be successful, and this consequently may lead to awarding high pay packages to long-tenured CEOs in 
order to maintain them (Ntim et al., 2017).  
With respect to CEO duality, managerial power hypothesis indicates that combining CEO and 
chairperson roles can diminish board independence and effectiveness by granting more power to CEOs, 
and that can increase CEOs influence over strategic decisions, including those relating to executive pay 
(Jensen, 1993; Conyon and He, 2011). Similarly, optimal contracting theory suggests that separating CEO 
and chairperson roles can reduce CEO power by increasing monitoring over the opportunistic behaviours 
of management (Conyon, 1997; Core et al., 1999), which can have positive impact on the pay setting 
process. Further, and in terms of CEO pay slice, managerial power and optimal contracting theories 
suggest that the concentration of power in CEOs can reduce the monitoring role of the board on 
executives, which can offer opportunities for CEOs to award themselves with overly generous pay 
packages (Bebchuk et al., 2011; Tian and Yang, 2014). As poor governance is associated with the 
concentration of power in CEOs, it can be expected that powerful CEOs are more likely to receive larger 
slice of the total pay awarded to executives than less powerful CEOs.  
The empirical evidence is largely consistent with the prediction that CEO power can reduce board 
independence and effectiveness, which may allow CEOs to reward themselves with overly generous pay 
packages (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2011; Conyon and Sadler, 2010; Conyon et al., 2009; Tian and Yang, 
2014). For example, using 390 UK listed firms from 1999 to 2005, Ozkan (2011) reports that long-tenured 
CEOs tend to receive higher pay than short-tenured CEOs. Renneboog and Zhao (2011), Conyon and He 
(2012) and Ntim et al. (2015a), for instance, have reported similar findings for samples of British, 
Chinese, and South African listed firms, respectively.  With respect to CEO duality, Brick et al. (2006) 
report a higher CEO pay for firms, which combined CEO and chairperson positions than those, which 
separated these two positions. Similarly, Core et al. (1999) reported similar findings for sample of US 
firms. However, Conyon (1997) and Renneboog and Zhao (2011) report no association between CEO 
duality and CEO pay for a sample of UK listed firms. With reference to CEO pay slice, studies examining 
its influence on executive pay are rare, and thus this study constitutes a timely contribution to the extant 
literature. Tian and Yang (2014) find a positive and significant association between CEO play slice and 
CEO pay for a sample of 179 US financial institutions. Hence, our third hypothesis to be tested is: 
13 
 
Hypothesis 3. There is an association between CEO power and executive pay. 
 
Ownership structure and executive pay 
Managerial power hypothesis suggests that firms with concentrated ownership structure may suffer 
from agency problems that arise from the conflict of interest problems between majority and minority 
shareholders. Conyon and He (2011, 2012), and Wang and Xiao (2011) suggest that block shareholders 
may connive with executives to maximise their own interests at the expense of minority of shareholders, 
and this can empower executives to pay themselves excessively high. Alternatively, optimal contracting 
theory suggests that ownership concentration can enhance monitoring on management activities by acting 
as alternative governance mechanism that can restrain the influence of managers over the decisions made 
by the board, and thereby allowing the board to design pay packages that are closely aligned with 
executive performance (Hartzell and Starks, 2003).  
With reference to institutional ownership, optimal contracting theory indicates that institutional 
owners, as powerful stakeholders, have more incentives to monitor the opportunistic behaviours of 
management (Ntim et al., 2017), and this is due to the fact that institutional shareholders tend to have 
large equity stakes in listed firms (Jafarinejad et al., 2015). Institutional shareholders also enjoy various 
advantages over their individual or less informed counterparts, including information, knowledge and 
skills (Ntim et al., 2015a). These advantages can allow institutional shareholders to exert more influence 
on a number of board decisions, including determining the appropriate level of executive pay. From 
managerial power hypothesis, institutional shareholders may not play active role in monitoring and 
preventing management from expropriating shareholders’ wealth, since they might be more interested in 
maximising their own liquidity and short-term profits (Ntim et al., 2015a). Consequently, this can offer 
managers opportunities to maximise their own utility by paying themselves excessively high at the 
expense of shareholders. In terms of managerial ownership, and from managerial power hypothesis 
perspective, higher managerial ownership can diminish board monitoring and effectiveness, because it 
can grant more power to managers over their own pay (Cyert et al., 2002; Morck et al., 1988). 
Alternatively, optimal contracting theory suggests that managerial ownership can help in aligning 
managers and shareholders’ interests by increasing managerial monitoring and preventing executives 
from expropriating shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Consequently, this can reduce the influence of executives over the level and structure of their pay. 
The empirical evidence is largely consistent with the view that concentrated ownership can mitigate 
agency problems through allowing block shareholders to set executive pay in such a way that aligns 
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executives’ interest with those of shareholders (e.g., Conyon and He, 2011; Dong and Ozkan, 2008; 
Hartzell and Starks, 2003). For example, Conyon and He (2011) and Sapp (2008) report a negative 
relationship between block ownership structure and CEO pay using a sample of Chinese and Canadian 
listed firms, respectively. With reference to institutional ownership, the findings of prior studies are 
mixed. For example, and consistent with the results of previous studies (e.g., Sapp, 2008), Dong and 
Ozkan (2010) and Ozkan (2007, 2011) report a negative relationship between institutional ownership and 
CEO pay using a sample of UK listed firms. By contrast, Cosh and Hughes (1997) find no association 
between institutional ownership and CEO pay for a sample of UK firms. However, much of the UK 
governance reforms (i.e., from 1992 Cadbury Report to 2016 Combined Code) is underpinned by an 
expectation that institutional shareholders will play an active role in improving governance practices, 
including restraining executive pay. Additionally, prior evidence on the link between director ownership 
and executive pay is largely in line with the view that higher director ownership can help in mitigating 
agency problems (including preventing executives from rewarding themselves with overly generous pay 
packages) by aligning managers and shareholders’ interests (Morck et al., 1988; Ozkan, 2007). For 
example, and consistent with the results of previous studies (e.g., Choe et al., 2014; Dong and Ozkan, 
2008; Ozkan, 2007), Tian and Wang (2014) report a negative relationship between the level of share 
ownership by CEOs and their pay. Therefore, and given the widespread nature of share ownership in the 
UK (Mallin et al., 2015), our fourth hypothesis to be tested is that:  
Hypothesis 4. There is an association between ownership structure and executive pay. 
Executive pay and performance (pay-for-performance sensitivity – PPS) 
The separation of ownership from control in modern firms has been suggested to be one of the main 
drivers for agency conflicts in modern corporations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), as rational managers 
may be motivated by their self-interests, and as such they may not necessarily act in the shareholders’ 
best interests. As a result, different governance mechanisms have been suggested that may be able to 
encourage managers to act in the shareholders’ best interests (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). In 
this case, executive pay has been suggested to be one of the most effective corporate governance 
mechanisms that can help in aligning management and shareholders’ interests (Beatty and Zajac, 1994), 
and this is the central driver for a number of recent UK corporate governance reforms, including those 
contained in the 1995 Greenbury Report, the 2002 Director Remuneration Report and the 2016 Combined 
Code.  
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A considerable number of existing corporate governance studies have, therefore, investigated the 
link between executive pay and performance (pay-for-performance sensitivity - PPS) (e.g,. Amzaleg et 
al., 2014; Bebchuk et al., 2011; Core et al., 1999; Core et al., 2003). Prior empirical literature generally 
finds a positive, but weak PPS (e.g., Amzaleg et al., 2014; Cheng and Firth, 2005; Core et al., 1999; 
Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Main et al., 1996; Murphy, 1999; Schultz et al., 2013; van Essen et al., 2015). 
For instance, Main et al. (1996) reports a positive, but weak link between CEO pay and performance for 
a sample of UK firms. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5. There is a positive link between executive pay and performance (PPS). 
The moderating effect of corporate governance on the PPS  
A major limitation of past studies examining executive pay–performance nexus is that they fail to 
control for corporate governance mechanisms that may influence the PPS. Therefore, and to overcome 
these limitations, a number of studies in the US (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Dong, 2014; Newton, 2015) and 
UK (e.g., Ozkan, 2007, 2011) have controlled for a comprehensive number of corporate governance 
variables (e.g., board and ownership mechanisms), when examining the PPS. In spite of controlling for a 
large number of corporate governance variables, many studies have reported weak PPS, implying that the 
findings of these studies largely lend support to the predictions of the managerial power hypothesis. A 
major weakness of existing literature is that they have only investigated the PPS for CEOs without 
considering other executive directors, such as CFOs.  
Additionally, these studies do not take into account possible endogeneity concerns that may result 
from simultaneously using both corporate governance (as monitoring mechanism) and executive pay (as 
alignment mechanism of interests) by corporations to mitigate agency problems (Ntim et al., 2015a. b). 
These limitations may help to explain the weak PPS that have been generally reported by past studies 
(Cho et al., 2014; Conyon and He, 2011, 2012). However, and as monitoring (corporate governance) and 
incentive alignment (executive pay) mechanisms are often employed together by firms in order to resolve 
agency problems, they may need to be interrelated or interdepended in order to be efficient in practice 
(Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2015a, b). One way of taking such potential 
interdependencies/simultaneities into account and thus, improve the PPS, is to conduct regressions 
containing interaction terms among our performance (e.g., TSR), incentive (executive pay) and 
monitoring (corporate governance quality) mechanisms. For example, good corporate governance may 
increase monitoring on the opportunistic behaviour of management and that can improve the PPS. Thus, 
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we hypothesise that firm-level corporate governance may interact with performance and executive pay in 
order to improve the PPS. Thus, our final hypothesis to be tested is: 
Hypothesis 6. Corporate governance moderates the association between executive pay and 
performance, with the PPS being stronger in firms with good corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
 
Research design 
Data considerations 
Four criteria were set to select the final sample: (i) the annual reports of the listed companies need 
to be available/accessible for the years from 2008 to 2013; (ii) a firm’s financial and corporate governance 
data must be available for all years from 2008 to 2013; (iii) availability of executive pay data for years 
from 2008 to 2013; and (iv) continuity of listing on the London Stock Exchange over the six years 
investigated. A number of reasons underlined the application of these criteria. First, we limit our sample 
to firms with consecutive-years data available, because corporate governance and executive pay data were 
manually collected, which was highly labour intensive activity (Ntim et al., 2013), and thereby serving as 
a limiting factor in terms of the amount firms/annual reports from which the required data could be 
collected from. Second, and in line with past corporate governance studies (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Ntim 
et al., 2015a, b), these criteria helped us to satisfy the requirement of a balanced panel analysis. Third, 
combining time-series and cross-sectional data can help in ascertaining whether any cross-sectional 
relationship among corporate governance mechanisms, executive pay, and performance holds over time. 
Fourth, the 2008 financial year was the first year when we started data collection because the financial 
crisis of 2007/08 has increased debate surrounding the effectiveness and the role of corporate governance 
in preventing managers from expropriating shareholders’ wealth. The 2013 financial year was the last 
year for which data was available at the time of collecting the data. 
A number of procedures have been followed in selecting our final sample. As at December 2013, a 
total of 1,297 firms were listed on the main board of the London Stock Exchange. First, we excluded 685 
firms operating in the financial and utility industries, leaving us with 612 (non-financial) listed firms 
during the 2008-2013 period. The financial and utilities were excluded for the following two reasons: (i) 
they have different capital structure and also different regulations (Guest, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012) and 
(ii) to facilitate comparisons with the results of prior studies (e.g., Mallin et al., 2015; Melis et al., 2015; 
Ntim et al., 2013; Ozkan, 2011), who also excluded financial and utilities from their sample. Second, we 
excluded 319 companies with missing annual reports/data/listed recently, leaving us with 293 companies 
with full data.  
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The classification of the remaining 293 companies is as follows: basic-materials consisted of 27 
(9%) companies; consumer-goods consisted of 36 (13%) companies; consumer-services consisted of 68 
(23%) companies; healthcare consisted of 15 (5%) companies; industrials consisted of 102 (35%) 
companies; oil and gas consisted of 18 (6%) companies; technology consisted of 22 (7%) companies; and 
telecommunications consisted of 5 (2%) companies. Third, because the number of observations from 
healthcare, oil and gas, and telecommunications industries was relatively small, the observations from 
these three industries were added to the basic-materials, consumer-services, and technology industries. In 
particular, corporations operating in the oil and gas industry were included in the basic-materials industry; 
corporations operating in the healthcare industry were added to the consumer-services industry, while 
corporations operating in the telecommunication industry were added to the technology industry. Finally, 
due to collecting the required data manually, which was highly labour intensive activity, coupled with the 
extensive nature of the corporate governance, executive pay, board, ownership, and financial data 
required, we restricted our final balanced sample to 100 companies from 2008 to 2013 (i.e., resulting in 
a sample of 600 company-year observations), which were stratifiedly sampled using both firm size and 
industry type. The selection of our final sample was particularly based on the ranking of the largest 10 
companies and the smallest 10 companies (i.e., 20 companies from each of the main 5 industries) in each 
industry using market capitalisation (see Table 1 for detailed information about sample selection 
procedure).  
We collected our data from two main sources. First, the corporate governance, board characteristics, 
ownership mechanisms and executive pay data were collected manually from the annual reports of the 
examined sample. Those reports were downloaded from companies’ websites and the Perfect Information 
database, whereas DataStream was used to collect the financial data. Unlike most past studies that focused 
only on the pay package of CEOs (e.g., Conyon and He, 2011, 2012; Core et al., 1999; Jouber and 
Fakhfakh, 2012; Ozkan, 2011; van Essen et al., 2015), we collected data on both cash and non-cash pay 
relating to CEOs, CFOs and all other executives. Second, we collected data on financial and accounting 
variable from DataStream. 
 
Definition of variables and model specification  
Table 2 presents summary definitions of the dependent, explanatory, interaction and control 
variables employed in this study. To test H1 to H4 (i.e., to answer our central research question: the effect 
of corporate governance on executive pay), we use three main types of variables, as follows: 
Dependent variable (executive pay) 
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Insert Table 2 about here 
Following prior studies (e.g., Conyon and He, 2011, 2012; Ntim et al., 2015a), total pay of the CEOs, 
the CFOs and all other executive directors, are our main dependent variable. Similarly, and following 
well established studies (e.g., Choe et al., 2014; Jouber and Fakhfakh. 2012; Ozkan, 2011), CEO pay or 
CFO pay is defined as the natural log of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash 
remuneration) and total non-cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other reported long-term incentive 
plans) pay in a financial year. Additionally and in line with Ntim et al. (2015a, 2017) and Schaefer (1998), 
all other executive directors’ pay is defined as the natural log of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and 
other reported cash remuneration) and total non-cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other reported 
long-term incentive plans) pay of all executive directors scaled by the total number of executive directors 
in a financial year.  
Independent variables 
 Our main independent variables are corporate governance mechanisms, which are measured by 
using a (i) broad UK corporate disclosure index (CGI), (ii) board structure variables (BSE and BD), (iii) 
CEO power variables (CEOT, DSPLIT and CEOS), and (iv) ownership mechanisms (MANO, ISTO and 
BLKO). With reference to the CGI, it has been developed based on the definition provided by the UK 
corporate governance codes. Specifically, Cadbury Report (1992) and FRC (2010a, b; 2012a, b) define 
good corporate governance to be underpinned by principles of accountability, fairness, independence, 
integrity, openness, responsibility, social responsibility and transparency. In this paper, we follow the 
UK Combined Code in defining the five main pillars of good corporate governance as: displaying strong 
(i) leadership; maintaining strong board (ii) effectiveness; maintaining high corporate (iii) accountability; 
applying fair and transparent (iv) remuneration practices; and maintaining good (v) relations with 
shareholders. Additionally, and following well-established literature (Bebchuk et al., 2009; Gompers et 
al., 2003; Larcker et al., 2007; Karpoff et al., 2016), we operationalise the concept of good corporate 
governance by measuring the presence or absence of 120 individual corporate governance items3 based 
on the 2012 UK Combined Code, with firms receiving higher scores considered to be better-governed 
(i.e., good/strong governance) and vice-versa (i.e., poor/weak governance). Appendix 1 presents the 
definitions of all the corporate governance disclosure provisions included in the CGI. 
 
                                                          
3These 120 governance provisions were mainly extracted from the 2012 UK Combined Code. We also relied on other 
sources, such as the 2006 Companies Act, the London Stock Exchange Listing Rules, Disclosure and Transparency 
Rules, and Insider Trading Law, in determining the final governance provisions included in our index.  
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 Corporate governance disclosure index coding process 
For transparency and replicability purposes, in this section, we describe in detail the process of 
coding our index. We constructed our CGI in a way that allows us to capture the qualitative differences 
in governance disclosures among different firms. With the issue of the quality of the govexrnance 
mechanisms in mind when designing our governance index, we inherently designed in a such a way that 
it naturally measures quality of the governance mechanisms rather than their mere disclosure in the annual 
reports. This quality approach mainly explains the relatively large number of items that we have in our 
index. For example, our index is designed in such a way that it avoids box-ticking by including a 
comprehensive list of items (i.e., 120 corporate governance provisions) compared with those of prior 
studies (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 2003). Consequently, this allows us to measure the 
qualitative differences in corporate governance disclosures across firms. For instance and if we take the 
quality of board committees, such as audit committee, rather than just measuring their mere presence by 
simply adding 1 if a company has an audit committee, otherwise 0, our index carefully attempts to 
measure the quality of the audit committee by investigating further whether the audit committee is also 
chaired by an independent non-executive director, whether it has been formed entirely by independent 
non-executive directors, whether it has members with financial expertise, whether the membership has 
been clearly disclosed, whether it organises regular meetings, and whether the members attendance record 
of such meetings is disclosed, amongst others. Similarly, with respect to the board structures, a value of 
1 is given to a firm if the chairperson of its board is an independent non-executive director. Additional 
one point is added if the roles of the board chairperson and CEO are separated. Another one point is added 
if the majority of the board members are independent non-executive directors, amongst others. Therefore, 
this detailed approach allows us to clearly distinguish firms with good governance mechanisms in place 
from those with poor governance mechanisms, and thereby helping us to measure compliance with the 
‘spirit’ rather than just the ‘letter’ of the UK corporate governance codes. Therefore, and following this 
widely employed binary (unweighted) coding scheme, a firm’s overall score of corporate governance 
disclosure may range between 0 and 120, which is then expressed as a percentage ranging from 0% (poor 
corporate governance disclosure index quality) to 100% (perfect corporate governance disclosure index 
quality) with higher compliance with the 2012 UK Combined Code.  
Although the unweighted scoring scheme has been criticised for not reflecting the relative 
importance associated with different corporate governance disclosure provisions (Beattie et al., 2004; 
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Gompers et al., 2003), we adopt this approach for the following reasons. First, unlike the ordinal 
(weighted) scoring scheme, the unweighted scoring scheme helps in enhancing the reliability and 
objectivity of our index, because it does not require making judgements in relation to the specific weight 
that needs to be given to different corporate governance disclosure provisions (Gompers et al., 2003; 
Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Second, there is no agreed theoretical framework to accurately assign weights to 
different corporate governance provisions, and thus our decision to use unweighted scoring scheme may 
limit the possibility that our index is biased towards any single or specific corporate governance provision, 
as is often the case with binary scoring scheme (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Third, existing studies indicate 
that both the unweighted and weighted scoring schemes provide similar results (e.g., Barako et al., 2006; 
Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). Finally, the use of unweighted coding scheme is based on a well-
established theoretical and empirical literature (e.g., Jouber and Fakhfakh. 2012; Newton. 2015; Ntim et 
al. 2015a), and hence, this may allow us to compare our findings with the results of past similar studies. 
The content analysis for this study was performed by a single coder. However, to ensure the 
reliability, validity and consistency of the coding framework, in the first round of coding, an initial sample 
of 10 companies (2 companies from each of the main five industries) over the period 2008-2013 were 
coded. Coding categories and coded materials were critically discussed with two experienced coders, and 
then in the second round, any mistakes or inconsistencies identified independently by the two coders in 
the first round were discussed and corrected. A further 10 firms were coded, but the two experienced 
coders independently did not identify any further mistakes or inconsistencies with the coding procedure. 
This ensured near perfect correlation between the first and second stage coding and thus, high levels of 
consistency, reliability, and validity were achieved.  
Additionally, and to examine the reliability of the constructed index, the current study used 
Cronbach’s alpha. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the five categories contained in the CGI is 0.861, 
indicating further that the corporate governance disclosure index employed in this study is a reliable and 
valid construct for corporate governance quality (Allegrini and Greco, 2013). 
Principal Component Analysis  
Although great efforts have been made to improve the validity and reliability of our index, existing 
literature suggests that not all of the 120 governance provisions included in our index may contribute to 
the observed effect of the CGI on executive pay, because some provisions may have significant 
explanatory power, whilst others may be less relevant or have less importance in terms of measuring 
corporate governance (Bebchuk et al., 2009; Brown and Caylor, 2006). To identify the most relevant 
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corporate governance provisions that contribute to the observed effect of the governance disclosure index 
and following existing literature (e.g., Black et al., 2016; Hoppe and Moers, 2011; Larcker et al., 2007; 
Karpoff et al., 2016), we use principal component analysis.  
Principal component analysis is a commonly used statistical method to reduce the number of 
predictor variables (i.e., corporate governance provisions) and determine variables that explain most of 
the variance (Larcker et al., 2007). Therefore, and in order to identify the underlying components of our 
CGI and determine which corporate governance provisions are associated with each component, we 
follow Black et al. (2016), Larcker et al. (2007) and Karpoff et al. (2016) by employing principal 
component analysis. We run the principal component analysis for each of our five sub-indices and we 
retained components with eigenvalues greater than one. This resulted in retaining 31 components that 
accounted for 68.04% of the total variance in our original data (see Appendix 2). Additionally and 
following Larcker et al. (2007), we retain all corporate governance provisions with loading values 
exceeding 0.40. This resulted in excluding four provisions, which are 19 (0.381), 21 (0.327), 97 (0.309) 
and 98 (0.320). Appendix 2 also shows that provisions number 4, 5, 3 and 7 are loaded most strongly on 
the first principal component. The loading values of all of these four corporate governance provisions are 
above 0.40, and thus we retained all of these provisions. Similarly, and as shown in Appendix 2, the 
loading of provisions number 2 and 6 are above 0.40, indicating that these provisions are loaded most 
strongly on the second principal component, and hence we retained these two provisions. We used this 
general approach (i.e., loading values that exceed 0.40) to determine the other corporate governance 
provisions that we finally retain. 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics and percentage of variation explained by each of the 31 
components. The mean value for the 31 components ranges between 0.979 and 0.007, indicating that there 
is adequate variation in the CGI.   
Insert Table 3 about here 
Control variables 
Additionally, previous studies suggest that the level of executive pay can be influenced by firm 
characteristics, such as firm size (Newton, 2015); size of auditing firm (Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 
2015a), capital expenditure (Ntim et al., 2015a); sales growth (Conyon and He, 2011, 2012); cross-listing 
(Fahlenbrach, 2009); and time and industry differences (Main et al., 1996). Therefore, we controlled for  
firm-level (i.e., firm size, audit firm size, capital expenditure, sales growth, cross-listing, industry and 
year dummies) characteristics in this study. 
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To address the first research question ((i.e., whether firm-level corporate governance disclosure 
impacts on executive pay (H1–H4)), the following models are proposed and tested using the ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression technique initially: 
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Where: PAY  is the main predicted variable that is measured using CEO (CEOP), CFO (CFOP) and 
all executive directors (AEDP) pay;  CGI (corporate governance inded), BSE (board size), BD (board 
diversity), CEOT (CEO tenure), DSPLIT (CEO–board chairperson role split), CEOS (CEO pay slice), 
MANO (managerial ownership), ISTO (institutional ownership) and BLKO (block ownership) are our 
main independent variables; and CONTS refers to the set of variables being controlled for, namely, firm 
size (LTA), audit firm size (AFS), capital expenditure (CEX), risk taking (RIS), sales growth (SG), cross-
listing (CL) , industry (IDU) and year (YDU) dummies. 
To test H5 and H6 (i.e., to answer our supplementary research question: the PPS and whether 
corporate governance on can moderate the PPS), we divided the study’s variables into five groups. First, 
our main dependent variable is total pay of the CEOs, the CFOs and all other executive directors. 
Executive pay (CEO, CFO, or all other executive directors) is broadly defined to include both cash and 
non-cash pay. Second, our main independent variable is firm performance, as measured by total 
shareholder return (TSR), which is consistent with Gregory-Smith (2012) and Ntim et al. (2015b, 2017). 
Third, we control for a number of variables that may affect executive pay, including board structure (BSE 
and BD), CEO power (CEOT, DSPLIT and CEOS), ownership structure (MANO, ISTO and BLKO), and 
firm characteristics, such as firm size (LTA), audit firm size (AFS), capital expenditure (CEX), risk taking 
(RIS), sales growth (SG), cross-listing (CL), industries (IDU) and year (YDU) dummies. Assuming that 
all the hypothesised relationships are linear, our initial OLS regression model to specifically test H5 (i.e., 
the PPS) is structured as follows: 
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Where: PAY is the main dependent variable; TSR is our main independent variable; and CONTS 
refers to control variables, including BSE, BD, CEOT, DSPLIT, CEOS, MANO, ISTO, BLOK, LTA, AFS, 
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CEX, RIS, SG, CL, IDU and YDU. As a robustness check, we also employ Tobin’s q (Q) and return on 
assets (ROA), as alterative market- and accounting-based measures, respectively.  
Fourth, and to specifically examine H6 (whether corporate governance disclosure index can 
moderate the PPS), we create an interaction variable by multiplying the firm-level corporate governance 
disclosure index and performance as follows: CGI times TSR or Q or ROA (P*CGI). Finally, we control 
for the same variables included in the third model in estimating our final model, which is as follows: 
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Where TSR refers to total shareholder return; CGI refers to the corporate governance disclosure 
index; and INT refers to their respective interaction variable, namely P*CGI; and CONTS remains the 
same as specified in equation (3). 
Empirical findings 
Descriptive analysis and bivariate correlation analyses 
The statistical summary of the pay of the CEO, CFO and all other executive directors is reported in 
Panels A-C in Table 4 over the 6-year period investigated (2008-2013). The panels suggest that the 
distribution of the total pay of CEOs, CFOs and all other executive directors varies substantially. For 
example, all other executive directors pay has a mean (median) of £7.49 million (£2.46 million) and 
ranges from £0.065 million to £105.58 million. Similarly, the distribution of the total pay of CEOs or 
CFOs shows similar pattern. The average CEO pay, for example, is £3.49 million, with a minimum value 
of £0.020 million and a maximum value of £61.44 million. Additionally, Table 4 shows that the average 
CEO pay is relatively higher compared with the average pay of other executive directors. Particularly and 
on average, CEOs seem to receive about £1.79 million (£3.55 million – £1.76 million) more in total pay 
than the CFOs. This suggests that CEOs continue to receive relatively higher pay compared with other 
executive directors, and that lends support for the findings of past UK studies (e.g. Conyon and Murphy, 
2000; Main et al., 1996; Ozkan, 2011). Crucially, and supporting the recommendations of the 2010 
corporate governance code that a large proportion of executive pay should be non-cash-based in order to 
align management and shareholders’ interests, total non-cash-based pay forms a large proportion of total 
executive pay among the UK sampled firms. Specifically, the mean value of total non-cash-based pay of 
all other executive directors (AEDs_non-cash) of £4.03 million is higher, and it is about 54% of the mean 
value of total pay (all other executive directors pay) of £7.53 million, whilst the mean value of total cash 
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pay of all other executive directors (AEDs_cash) of £3.50 million is only 46% of the mean value of total 
pay (all other executive directors pay) of £7.53 million. The evidence that executives are paid higher non-
cash-based remuneration compared with cash-based remuneration is largely consistent with those 
reported by past US studies (e.g., Cyert et al., 2002; Dong, 2014). 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Further, Panels D-H of Table 4 present summary descriptive statistics relating to the corporate 
performance, corporate governance and control variables, respectively. Overall, these panels show wide 
spread for all variables under examination. For instance, and similar to the results of past corporate 
governance studies (e.g., Gregory-Smith. 2012), TSR ranges from -0.60 to 0.91 with an average (a 
median) of 0.086 (0.03), suggesting that our sampled firms are, on average, profitable. The corporate 
governance disclosure index (CGI) also varies substantially, ranging from 17% to 81% with the mean 
(median) companies complying with 52% (64%) of the 120 governance provisions investigated. The 
mean board size of 8 is consistent with that reported by Ozkan (2011). The mean institutional ownership 
of 38% is close to the 30% found by Dong and Ozkan (2008) for a sample of UK firms. The average 11% 
of board diversity suggests that, on average, the boards of UK listed firms are dominated by white males. 
With reference to the other remaining variables, all show wide variation, indicating that the sample is 
sufficiently made up of a mixture of small and large firms, and thereby minimising any possibilities of 
sample selection bias.  
The correlation coefficients of both Pearson and Spearman are reported in Table 5 in order to identify 
the presence of any potential multicollinearity problems. The direction and magnitude of both correlation 
matrices are relatively similar, indicating that any remaining non-normalities in the variables employed 
are not likely to be serious to violate the assumptions of OLS regression (Ntim et al., 2015b). Additionally, 
the correlation coefficients of Spearman and Pearson are relatively low and the values of the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) reported in Tables 7 and 8 also do not exceed 10, indicating that there are no serious 
multicollinearity problems (Field, 2009).  
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Overall and focusing on the Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, Table 5 indicates 
statistically strong associations among the executive pay (CEOs, CFOs, or all other executive directors), 
corporate governance, performance and control variables. For example, the findings suggest that 
companies with larger portions of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and block ownership 
pay significantly lower remuneration to their CEOs, CFOs and all other executive directors. Additionally, 
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there is a discernible evidence that cross-listed (CL), larger (LTA), capital intensive (CEX), auditing by a 
big-4 firm (AFS), larger boards (BSE), diversed boards (BD) and profitable (TSR, Q and ROA) firms pay 
significantly higher remuneration to their CEOs, CFOs and all other executive directors.  
 
Multivariate Regression Analyses 
The empirical findings of the effect of corporate governance disclosure index on executive pay 
 
Table 6 presents the empirical findings of the impact of corporate governance disclosure index (CGI) 
containing 31 key components developed from 120 corporate governance provisions, on CEO pay. 
Specifically, the table contains the results relating to the effect of corporate governance disclosure index 
on the pay package of CEOs explaining cash, non-cash and total pay as the dependent variables, 
respectively. Prior studies suggest that good corporate governance structures may help in reducing agency 
problems by increasing managerial monitoring capacity, and thus prevent executives from expropriating 
shareholders’ wealth (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). To test this, we examine the effect of the 
CGI on executive pay. The coefficients of CGI on cash, non-cash and total pay for CEOs (-1.199, -2.578 
and -2.026) in Table 6 are statistically negative at 1%. Overall, the results provide empirical support for 
H1. 
The empirical findings of the CGI along with the control variables on CFOs and AEDs’ pay are 
reported in Table 7 (,er account for potential size-effects in the total pay of all other executive directors, 
we run median regressions). It contains the results for six models relating to CFOs and all other executive 
directors explaining cash, non-cash and total pay. The coefficients of CGI on cash, non-cash and total pay 
for CFOs (-0.976, -2.065 and -1.454) and all other executive directors (-1.314, -2.451 and -1.971) are 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that our first hypothesis (H1) is empirically supported. 
In addition to examining the effect of the CGI on executive pay for our entire sample, we divided 
our sample into two main categories: (i) well-governed firms (firms having a CGI score above the mean 
value of 52%); and (ii) poorly-governed firms (firm having a CGI score below the mean value of 52%). 
The reason behind doing this is to provide more informative inferences about our data. The findings are 
presented in Table 8. In terms of well-governed firms, the coefficients of the CGI on the total pay of 
CEOs (-1.800), CFOs (-1.152) and AEDs’ (-1.810) pay are negative and statistically significant, whereas 
the coefficients of the CGI on the total pay of CEOs (-1.592), CFOs (-0.820) and AEDs (-1.930) for 
poorly-governed firms are negative, but not statistically significant, suggesting that our first hypothesis is 
empirically supported. 
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The empirical findings of the effect of individual governance mechanisms and executive pay 
Table 6 also presents the results of pooled OLS regression of board structure variables (BSE and 
BD), CEO power measures (DSPLIT, CEOT and CEOS), and ownership structure variables (MANO, ISTO 
and BLKO) along with the control variables on CEOs’ pay. Specifically, Table 6 contains three models 
explaining the effect of these eight individual governance mechanisms (i.e., BSE, BD, DSPLIT, CEOT, 
CEOS, MANO, ISTO and BLKO) on CEOs’ cash, non-cash and total pay. First, and with reference to the 
board structure variables, the positive and significant association between BSE and CEOs’ cash and total 
pay provides support for H2. However, the insignificant effect of BD on cash and total pay of CEOs does 
not provide support for H2. Second, the separation of CEO and chairperson roles (DSPLIT) is negatively 
associated with CEOs’ cash and total pay, suggesting that H3 is empirically support. Similarly, results 
reported in Table 6 indicate that both CEO tenure (CEOT) and CEO pay slice (CEOs) are positively 
associated with CEOs pay, implying that H3 is further supported. Finally, and with reference to the 
ownership mechanisms, the results contained in Table 6 suggest that managerial ownership (MANO) and 
block ownership (BLKO) are negatively associated with the CEO pay. This implies that H4 is empirically 
supported. However, the insignificant influence of institutional ownership on CEOs’ pay does not provide 
support for H4.  
With reference to the effect of the individual governance mechanisms on CFOs and AEDs’ cash, 
non-cash and total pay, the results contained in Table 7 are generally consistent with our developed 
hypotheses. First, the coefficients of BSE on non-cash pay in Model 2 for CFOs, and those in Models 4 
to 6 for AEDs’ cash, non-cash and total pay, are all negative and statistically significant. This implies that 
H2 is accepted. However, the insignificant influence of BD on CFOs and AEDs’ cash and total pay does 
not provide support for H2. Second, the insignificant effect of DSPLIT and CEOS on CFOs and AEDs’ 
pay does not provide support for H3, whereas the positive and significant effect of CEOT on CFOs and 
AEDs’ pay is in line with H3. Finally, the negative and significant effect of both MANO and BLKO on 
CFOs and AEDs’ pay is consistent with H4. In terms of institutional ownership (ISTO), the coefficients 
on the cash pay in Model 1 for CFOs, and those in Models 4-6 for AEDs are all positive, but statistically 
insignificant, indicating that ISTO has no influence on cash pay of CFOs, and on cash, non-cash and total 
pay of AEDs. Similarly, the positive and significant influence of ISTO on non-cash and total pay of CFOs 
does not provide support for H4. 
The results relating to executive pay-performance nexus  
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The empirical findings of the executive pay along with the control variables on corporate 
performance are reported in Table 9. It contains the results of nine models relating to CEOs (Columns 2-
4), CFOs (Columns 5-7) and all other executive directors (Columns 8-10) explaining cash, non-cash and 
total pay. The coefficients of TSR on executive pay (CEOs, CFOs and AEDs) are observably small 
(ranging from 0.455 for CEOs’ non-cash pay to 0.142 for CFOs cash pay), which lends empirical support 
for H5. Additionally, the empirical findings relating to the potential moderating effect of corporate 
governance disclosure index (i.e., CGI) on the PPS are reported in Table 10. Specifically, Table 10 reports 
findings relating to TSR, Q and ROA performance measures for the total CEO pay (Models 1-3), Models 
4 to 6 do similarly for the CFO measure, whilst Models 7 to 9 report similar results for all other executive 
directors alternative. In addition, all control variables contained in Table 9 are included in Table 10. 
Crucially, it is clearly observable from our results that, regardless of the executive pay proxy used, the 
PPS has noticeably improved, implying that H6 is empirically supported. 
Finally, we carried out several additional tests to check the robustness of our results. Specifically, 
we run four different tests, a: (i) fixed-effects model; (ii) lagged structure model; (iii) generalised method 
of moments estimator (GMM); and (iv) Heckman (1979) sample selection bias test, which for brevity not 
reported, but will be available upon request. Overall, the findings of these additional analyses indicated 
that our results were not driven by any potential endogenity and sample selection bias problems.  
 
Discussion 
Columns 2-4 of Table 6 reports results relating to the effect of the CGI on cash, non-cash and total 
pay of CEOs, respectively. The associated coefficients of the CGI are negative and statistically significant, 
supporting the view that well-governed firms pay significantly lower levels of remuneration to their CEOs 
than their poorly-governed counterparts. Similarly, the results reported in Columns 2-4 and 6-8 of Table 
7 relating to CFOs and AEDs, respectively, suggest that well-governed firms pay significantly lower cash, 
non-cash and total pay to their CFOs and all other executive directors, than their poorly-governed 
counterparts. The negative effect of the CGI lends empirical support for the recommendations of UK 
corporate governance codes (e.g., 1992 Cadbury Report and 2012 Combined Code) and  the findings of 
past corporate governance studies (e.g., Fahenbrach, 2009; Jouber and Fakhfakh, 2012; Newton, 
2015.Theoretically, our evidence offers empirical support for both managerial power hypothesis and  
optimal contracting theory, indicating that under poor governance conditions (managerial power 
hypothesis) managers can control the board and reward themselves with overly generous pay packages 
(Ntim et al., 2015a, b; Ozkan, 2007), whereas under good corporate governance conditions (optimal 
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contracting theory), managers have less influence on their pay, and thereby allowing the board to design 
pay packages that may be more closely aligned with executive performance (Dong, 2014; Edmans and 
Gabaix, 2009).  
Insert Table 6 about here 
Insert Table 7 about here 
To examine the robustness of the obtained findings (reported in Tables 6 and 7) relating to the effect 
of the CGI on CEOs, CFOs and AEDs’ pay, we divide our sample using the mean value of the CGI. This 
resulted in having two groups (i.e., well-governed and poorly-governed firms). The results reported in 
Table 8 suggest that firms with higher CGI scores tend to pay their executive significantly lower than 
their poorly-governed firms (i.e., firms with lower CGI scores). The findings indicate that under good 
governance structures, executive pay packages are designed in a way that helps in aligning management 
and shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, under weak governance structures, 
opportunistic executives can expropriate the wealth of shareholders by having the power to influence their 
own pay (Choe et al., 2014; Shleifer andVishny, 1997).  
Insert Table 8 about here 
In terms of the individual governance mechanisms, most of them bear the expected sign. For 
example, the findings reported in Tables 6 and 7 reveal that board diversity, along with splitting the CEO 
and chairperson positions are associated negatively with the cash-based and total pay for CEOs, which is 
consistent with the findings of prior studies (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Conyon and He, 2011). By 
contrast, they are positively linked with the non-cash-based pay for CEOs, CFOs and AEDs, suggesting 
that board diversity and splitting of the CEO and chairperson positions help to align management and 
shareholders’ interests by increasing board independence from management. Additionally, we have found 
evidence that board size and CEO tenure impact positively on CEO pay, as reported by Conyon and He 
(2012), Guest (2009) and Ozkan (2011). Theoretically, these findings support the view that firms with 
larger boards and longer-tenured CEOs suffer agency problems that arise from empowering CEOs to have 
greater control of the board, and that can increase the influence of CEOs over the decisions made by the 
board, and thereby allowing CEOs to pay themselves excessively high (Ntim et al., 2015a, b; Ozkan, 
2007). In contrary, the coefficients of BSE on the non-cash and total pay in Models 2 and 3 for CFOs, and 
those in Models 4-6 for AEDs, are negative.  This implies that larger boards are more difficult to be 
controlled by CFOs and other executive directors (not CEOs) compared to smaller boards because they 
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are associated with more expertise and experience. That can restrain the influence of CFOs and AEDs 
over the decisions made by the board, and thereby allowing the board to design pay packages that are 
closely aligned with executive performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  
With reference to CEO pay slice (CEOS), the results reported in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that CEOS 
is positively and significantly associated with cash, non-cash and total pay of CEOs, but insignificantly 
associated with CFOs and AEDs pay. The significant effect of the CEOS on CEOs’ pay is consistent with 
the findings of Bebchuk et al. (2011) and Tian and Yang (2014), implying that the concentration of power 
in CEOs can reduce the monitoring role of the board on CEOs, which can allow CEOs to reward 
themselves with overly generous pay packages. 
In terms of ownership structure variables, the results contained in Tables 6 and 7 for the three models 
relating to their effect on the pay of CEOs, CFOs and AEDs are mixed. Specifically, and in line with 
previous studies (e.g., Baixauli-Soler and Sanchez-Marin, 2015), our evidence reveals that managerial 
ownership and block ownership are associated with lower CEO pay, implying that higher managerial 
ownership and block ownership help to align management and shareholders’ interests by bringing more 
effective monitoring on the opportunistic behaviour of management (Wang and Xiao, 2011). In contrast, 
our evidence shows that institutional ownership is insignificantly associated with CEOs’ pay, suggesting 
that institutional investors are passive and ineffective in monitoring management (Dong and Ozkan, 
2008).  
With reference to the PPS, the results contained in Table 9 suggest that there is a positive, but weak 
link between executive pay and performance, and this is consistent with the findings of Adams and 
Ferreira (2009). Theoretically, our evidence offers support for the predictions of managerial power 
hypothesis, which views executive pay as a result of close negotiations between weak/dependent board 
and strong executives that may lead to the design of ineffective incentive contracts that tend to increase 
agency problems (Choe et al., 2014; Mallin et al., 2015). Thus, managerial power hypothesis predicts a 
weak PPS, due to the assumption that executives have strong influence in setting their own pay (Van 
Essen et al., 2015). 
Insert Table 9 about here 
Table 10 contains OLS regression results investigating the potential moderating effect of CGI on 
the PPS. Overall, the results suggest that corporate governance significantly moderates the PPS. For 
instance, the magnitude of the coefficient of the TSR on the total pay of CEO has improved from 0.242 
in Model 3 of Table 10, to 0.466 in Model 1 of Table 10. The results, therefore, provide empirical support 
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for H6 that CGI moderates the association between executive pay and performance, with the PPS being 
stronger in firms with good corporate governance practices. Similarly, the magnitude of the coefficient 
of the TSR on the total CFO and all other executive director pay has improved from 0.197 (Model 3) and 
0.247 (Model 9) of Table 9 to 0.583 (Model 4) and 0.416 (Model 7) of Table 10, respectively, implying 
that firm-level corporate governance moderates the PPS, with the PPS being stronger in firms with good 
CG practices (Newton, 2015; Sapp, 2008).     
Insert Table 10 about here 
We also used Tobin’s Q (Q) and return on assets (ROA) as market and accounting-based alternative 
performance proxies to check the robustness of our findings. These alternative performance proxies have 
been used in this study because they are considered to be appropriate and also because they have 
excessively been used in the prior literature (e.g., Conyon, 1997; Ntim et al., 2015a, 2016; Ozkan, 2011). 
The results generally indicate that corporate governance significantly moderates the PPS. Observably, 
and on a comparison basis, our evidence suggests that the PPS is higher (significant at 1% level) for CEO 
and CFO than all other executive pay (significant at 5%), and this may due to the strategic nature of CEO 
and CFO roles (Ntim et al., 2017). 
Finally, and with regard to the interaction variables, the results presented in Table 10 generally offer 
evidence of a moderating impact of firm-level corporate governance (CGI) on the PPS, which largely 
supports our hypothesis (H6), as well as the predictions of optimal contracting theory. Specifically, the 
statistically significant and negative effect of P*CGI on CEO, CFO or all other executive directors pay 
in Models 1 to 9 of Table 10 provides support for H6. The interacted variable (CGI) has improved the 
magnitude of TSR, Q and ROA and this suggests that strong corporate governance quality (in the form of 
higher compliance with 2012 Combined Code) moderates the association between executive pay and 
performance, with the PPS being stronger in firms with good corporate governance practices. Observably, 
our findings contribute to a small, but increasing number of evidence, which suggests that firm-level 
corporate governance  has a moderating impact on the PPS (Baixauli-Soler and Sanchez-Marin, 2015; 
Ntim et al., 2017). Table 11 provides a summary of the empirical findings and the hypothesised 
relationships among the corporate governance mechanisms, executive pay and PPS. 
Insert Table 11 about here 
Conclusions 
This study examines whether corporate governance structures do influence executive directors’ pay, 
and consequently ascertains whether corporate governance can moderate the pay-for-performance 
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sensitivity (PPS) for UK listed firms. Specifically, we investigate the impact of firm-level corporate 
governance quality on the cash, non-cash and total pay for chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief 
financial officers (CFOs), as well as all other executive directors (AEDs). Additionally, we examine the 
link between executive pay (CEOs, CFOs and AEDs) and corporate performance, and consequently 
examine the moderating influence of corporate governance disclosure index on the PPS. Our study, 
therefore, extends, as well as makes a number of new contributions to the growing body of literature on 
the antecedents of executive pay. 
First, we contribute to the literature by employing a principal component analysis technique to 
develop and introduce a new alternative governance disclosure index containing 31 key components out 
of 120 comprehensive governance provisions from the UK Combined Code for UK firms and researchers. 
Second, we extend and contribute to the extant literature by examining the impact of our newly developed 
corporate governance disclosure index on executive pay. There is a scarcity of studies that have 
investigated the impact of corporate governance disclosure index on executive pay. The findings indicate 
that companies with stronger corporate governance structures tend to pay their executives significantly 
lower than their poorly-governed counterparts, and thereby providing support for both the optimal 
contracting theory and managerial power hypothesis.  
Third, previous studies examining the impact of corporate governance on executive pay have almost 
examined only the impact of few individual corporate governance variables on CEOs pay, whereas studies 
which have examined the impact of board structure, CEO power and ownership mechanisms on executive 
pay are scarce. Therefore, this study contributes to the extant literature by examining the link among 
board structure (board size and board diversity), CEO power (CEO tenure, CEO duality and CEO pay 
slice), ownership (managerial ownership, institutional ownership and block ownership) and executive pay 
(CEOs, CFOs and AEDs). Overall, the results indicate that board structure, CEO power and ownership 
variables have a significant impact on executive pay among UK firms. 
Fourth, the study reports empirical evidence of a positive, but weak link between executive pay and 
corporate performance. Our evidence supports managerial power hypothesis perspective, which predicts 
weak PPS. Managerial power hypothesis suggests that in corporations with weak corporate governance 
structures, executives tend to have strong influence over setting their own pay, leading to a weak PPS. 
The evidence of a positive, but weak PPS lends support for the findings of past corporate governance  
studies (e.g., Amzaleg et al., 2014; Cheng and Firth, 2005; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990;  Schultz et al., 2013).  
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Fifth, previous studies (e.g., Choe et al., 2014; Conyon and He, 2011, 2012) have only examined the 
PPS without taking into account possible endogeneity concerns that may result from simultaneous use of 
both monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms by corporations to mitigate agency problems. 
Therefore, this study aimed to extend, as well as contribute to the existing studies by investigating why 
and how corporate governance can moderate the PPS. We find that the PPS improves considerably in 
firms with good corporate governance structures. This evidence provides support for optimal contracting 
theory, which suggests that in firms with good corporate governance mechanisms, executive pay packages 
can be designed in a way that helps to align management and shareholders’ interests, and thereby 
improving the PPS.  
Sixth, the results of the study have important implications for policy-makers and regulator of other 
countries that are intending to or are currently pursuing corporate governance and executive director pay 
policy reforms. The major implication of our findings is that policy reforms relating to monitoring 
(corporate governance) and incentive alignment (executive pay) should be pursued jointly for greater 
effectiveness. The methodological implication of the evidence is that firm-level corporate governance 
moderates the PPS provides new empirical insights from the managerial power hypothesis and optimal 
contracting theory. Further and methodologically, future researchers may be able to employ our new 
governance disclosure index as an alternative to the US-centric ones. 
Seventh, the evidence provided in this paper offers potential empirical and theoretical insight for 
future studies. In terms of empirical expansions, this paper focused only on the UK, however, future 
research can extend our study by examining the impact of corporate governance on executive pay and 
consequently whether corporate governance moderates the PPS in different international governance 
environments (i.e., developing and/or developed countries with different economic systems and 
characteristics). With reference to theoretical expansions, the evidence indicates that future studies can 
possibly enhance their theoretical grounds by relying on the insights provided by other closely related 
governance theories, including equity fairness, lake ‘Wobegon’ effect, managerial talent, stewardship and 
tournament theories, when examining the drivers of executive pay.  
Finally, although the results of this study are robust to alternative estimations and models, our study 
has some limitations, including limiting our analysis to only internal corporate governance mechanisms. 
Hence, and as data becomes accessible, future studies can consider how both internal and external 
corporate governance mechanisms can influence executive pay. The current study has examined the 
factors driving executive pay from a quantitative perspective, a future research can enhance our 
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understanding by conducting in-depth interviews and qualitative analysis to gain further insights relating 
to the drivers of executive pay and the PPS. Also, like most archival research of this nature, the proxies 
for governance, pay and performance may or may not reflect actual practice. For example, governance 
quality may simply refers to disclosure of governance rather than actual governance quality of a firm, 
which is very to difficult observe in practice. Further, due to the labour intensive nature of manual data 
collection, we limited our sample to a relatively smaller size and therefore, could arguably influence the 
generalisability of our findings, although the findings of the Heckman (1979) sample selection bias 
suggest that this may not be the case. Future research may, therefore, improve upon the current study by 
employing a much larger sample size. Similarly, we restricted our analysis to the period after the 2007/08 
global financial crisis, since prior UK studies have investigated the period before the global financial 
crisis. In this case, future studies may improve our analysis by including the period before and after the 
2007/08 crisis and examine whether the crisis has had an effect on the link among corporate governance, 
pay and performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices  
Appendix 1: Corporate governance disclosure index (CGI) 
CGI theme CGI items: information on or reference to scoring 
Leadership Sub-Index 
 
(i) Board structure  
 
 
1. Board membership 
 
 
0 - 1 
 2. Role duality 0 - 1 
 3. Frequency of board meetings (BMs) 0 - 1 
 4. Individual directors’ attendance of BMs 0 - 1 
 5. Attendance of the majority of BMs 0 - 1 
 6. Statement on chairperson’s independence  0 - 1 
 7. Senior independent director appointment  0 - 1 
 8. Roles of the board and management 0 - 1 
Effectiveness Sub-Index 
 
(ii) Board and directors 
 
 
9.  Board chairperson is non-executive director (NED) 
 
 
0 - 1 
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 10. Chairperson independence 0 - 1 
 11. Board composition 0 - 1 
 12. Classification of directors 0 - 1 
   
(iii) Board and directors’ evaluation 13. Process of evaluating board/executives 0 - 1 
 14. Evaluation of board performance 0 - 1 
 15. Evaluation of individual directors’ performance 0 - 1 
 16. Evaluation of board’s committees’ performance 0 - 1 
 17. Evaluation of CEO’s performance  0 - 1 
 18. Evaluation of chairperson’s performance 0 - 1 
 19. Externally facilitated evaluation 0 - 1 
   
(iv) Re-election of board’s members 20. Process of board/executives’ re-election 0 - 1 
 21. Directors’ names 0 - 1 
 22. Directors’ biographical details 0 - 1 
 23. Directors other details 0 - 1 
 24. Directors’ experience 0 - 1 
   
(v) Induction and training programmes 25. Induction and training provided to all directors  0 - 1 
 26. Details on training programmes 0 - 1 
   
(vi) Free legal advice 27. Access to free independent legal advice 0 - 1 
   
(vii) Insider trading/dealing  28. Directors/officers dealings and securities 0 - 1 
 29. Directors/officers share dealings 0 - 1 
   
(viii) Nomination committee (NC) 30. Existence  0 - 1 
 31. Terms of reference 0 - 1 
 32. Membership 0 - 1 
 33. Composition 0 - 1 
 34. Chairperson independence  0 – 1 
 35. Frequency of NC meetings 0 - 1 
 36. Individual members’ attendance of NC meetings 0 - 1 
 37. Attendance of the majority of NC meetings 0 - 1 
 38. Evaluation of the committee as a group 0 - 1 
 39. Evaluation of chairperson   0 - 1 
 40. Evaluation of individual members 0 - 1 
(ix) Office of a company secretary  41. Existence 0 - 1 
 42. Identity  0 - 1 
 43. Terms of reference  0 - 1 
 44. Attendance of board’s meetings 0 - 1 
 45. Meeting attendance record 0 - 1 
Continuation: Appendix 1, Corporate governance disclosure index (CGI) 
CGI theme CGI items: information on or reference to scoring 
Accountability Sub-Index 
 
(x) Board accountability  
 
 
46. Preparing annual report and accounts 
 
 
0 - 1 
 47. Status of a firm’s going concern 0 - 1 
(xi) Audit committee (AC) 48. Existence  0 - 1 
 49. Reviewing risk management systems 0 - 1 
 50. Terms of reference  0 - 1 
 51. Membership  0 - 1 
 52. Composition 0 - 1 
 53. Chairperson independence  0 - 1 
 54. Frequency of AC meeting  0 - 1 
 55. Individual members’ attendance of AC meetings 0 - 1 
 56. Attendance of the majority of AC meetings 0 - 1 
 57. External auditor’s scope and responsibility  0 - 1 
 58. External audit meetings 0 - 1 
 59. External audit private meetings 0 - 1 
 60. Audit fees 0 - 1 
 61. Evaluation of audit committee as a group 0 - 1 
 62. Evaluation of chairperson  0 - 1 
 63. Evaluation of individual members 0 - 1 
(xii) Risk management  64. Actual and potential risks 0 - 1 
 65. Risk evaluation 0 - 1 
 66. Policy of risk management 0 - 1 
 67. Risk management committee (RMC) 0 - 1 
 68. Terms of reference  0 - 1 
 69. Membership 0 - 1 
 70. Composition 0 - 1 
 71. Frequency of RMC meetings 0 - 1 
 72. Individual members’ attendance of RMC meetings 0 – 1 
 73. Attendance of the majority of RMC meetings 0 - 1 
 74. Evaluation of risk committee as a group 0 - 1 
 75. Evaluation of chairperson  0 - 1 
 76. Evaluation of individual members 0 - 1 
(xiii) Internal audit and control 77. Internal control policy and procedure 0 - 1 
 78. Existence of internal audit unit 0 - 1 
 79. Annual meetings with audit committee 0 - 1 
 80. Private meetings with audit committee 0 - 1 
 81. Review of risk and internal control systems 0 - 1 
Remuneration Sub-Index 
 
(xiv) Remuneration committee (RC) 
 
 
82. Existence  
 
 
0 - 1 
 83. Membership 0 - 1 
 84. Composition 0 - 1 
 85. Chairperson independence  0 - 1 
 86. Frequency of RC meetings 0 - 1 
 87. Individual members’ attendance of RC meetings 0 - 1 
 88. Attendance of the majority of RC meetings 0 - 1 
 89. Evaluation of chairperson 0 - 1 
 90. Evaluation of individual members 0 - 1 
 91. Terms of reference  0 - 1 
 92. CEO’s remuneration 0 - 1 
 93. Other directors’ remuneration 0 - 1 
 94. All directors’ cash remuneration 0 - 1 
 95. NEDs’ remuneration 0 - 1 
 96. All directors’ non-cash remuneration 0 - 1 
Continuation: Appendix 1, Corporate governance disclosure index (CGI) 
CGI theme CGI items: information on or reference to scoring 
 97. Say on executive pay policy 0 - 1 
 98. Directors’ ownership interests 0 - 1 
 99. Composition of NEDs’ remuneration 0 - 1 
 100. Remuneration consultants 0 - 1 
 101. All directors’ remuneration by name 0 - 1 
 102. Directors’ long-term incentive plan  0 - 1 
 103. Directors’ remuneration philosophy  0 - 1 
Relations with Shareholders Sub-Index 104. Obligations to shareholders 0 - 1 
 105. Notice on annual general meetings (AGMs) 0 - 1 
 106. Disclosure of shareholders’ rights 0 - 1 
 107. Names of board member attend AGM 0 - 1 
 108. Board chairman attendance of AGM 0 - 1 
 109. NC chairman attendance of AGM 0 - 1 
 110. RC chairman attendance of AGM 0 - 1 
 111. AC chairman attendance of AGM 0 – 1 
 112. RMC chairman attendance of AGM 0 - 1 
 113. Shareholder activism 0 - 1 
 114. Proxy voting policy  0 - 1 
 115. Obligations to society/community 0 - 1 
 116. Environmental issues 0 - 1 
 117. Social issues 0 - 1 
 118. Employee training and education programmes 0 - 1 
 119. Health and safety 0 - 1 
 120. Code of ethics 0 - 1 
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Appendix 2: Loadings on individual corporate governance provisions for each of the 31 components 
Principal Component (Factor) CGI items: information on or reference to Loading 
value 
Leadership Sub-Index 
Principal Component No. 1 
 
4. Individual directors’ attendance of BMs 
 
0.896 
 5. Attendance of the majority of BMs 0.892 
 3. Frequency of board meetings (BMs) 0.672 
 7. Senior independent director appointment 0.621 
   
Principal Component No. 2 2. Role duality 0.842 
 6. Statement on chairperson’s independence 0.622 
   
Principal Component No. 3 8. Roles of the board and management 0.713 
 1. Board membership -0.522 
Effectiveness Sub-Index 
Principal Component No. 4 
 
16. Evaluation of board’s committees’ performance 
 
0.916 
 15. Evaluation of individual directors’ performance 0.879 
 38. Evaluation of the committee as a group 0.877 
 14. Evaluation of board performance 0.812 
 13. Process of evaluating board/executives 0.779 
 17. Evaluation of CEO’s performance  0.650 
 36. Individual members’ attendance of NC meetings 0.558 
 37. Attendance of the majority of NC meetings 0.544 
 43. Terms of reference of a company secretary  0.501 
   
Principal Component No. 5 32. Membership of NC 0.899 
 30. Existence of NC 0.878 
 33. Composition of NC 0.796 
 31. Terms of reference of NC 0.666 
 20. Process of board/executives’ re-election 0.556 
   
Principal Component No. 6 39. Evaluation of chairperson   0.937 
 40. Evaluation of individual members 0.937 
 18. Evaluation of chairperson’s performance 0.440 
   
Principal Component No. 7 42. Identity of a company secretary 0.806 
 12. Classification of directors 0.742 
 41. Existence of a company secretary  0.731 
   
Principal Component No. 8 10. Chairperson independence 0.847 
 34. Chairperson independence of NC 0.753 
 9.  Board chairperson is non-executive director (NED) 0.439 
   
Principal Component No. 9 26. Details on training programmes 0.798 
 25. Induction and training provided to all directors 0.637 
 29. Directors/officers share dealings 0.532 
   
Principal Component No. 10 45. Meeting attendance record 0.959 
 44. Attendance of board’s meetings 0.959 
   
Principal Component No. 11 24. Directors’ experience 0.858 
 22. Directors’ biographical details 0.823 
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Continuation: Appendix 2, Loadings on individual corporate governance provisions for each of the 31 components 
Principal Component (Factor) CGI items: information on or reference to Loading 
value 
Principal Component No. 12 28. Directors/officers dealings and securities 0.812 
 23. Directors other details 0.571 
   
Principal Component No. 13 35. Frequency of NC meetings 0.571 
 27. Access to free independent legal advice -0.527 
 11. Board composition 0.425 
Accountability Sub-Index 
Principal Component No. 14 
 
73. Attendance of the majority of RMC meetings 
 
0.928 
 71. Frequency of RMC meetings 0.928 
 72. Individual members’ attendance of RMC meetings 0.928 
 76. Evaluation of individual members 0.879 
 74. Evaluation of risk committee as a group 0.671 
 75. Evaluation of chairperson  0.671 
   
Principal Component No. 15 79. Annual meetings with audit committee 0.846 
 80. Private meetings with audit committee 0.767 
 78. Existence of internal audit unit 0.700 
 58. External audit meetings 0.626 
 59. External audit private meetings 0.595 
 61. Evaluation of audit committee as a group 0.491 
 52. Composition of AC 0.459 
 65. Risk evaluation 0.407 
   
Principal Component No. 16 60. Audit fees 0.825 
 47. Status of a firm’s going concern 0.805 
 81. Review of risk and internal control systems 0.754 
 46. Preparing annual report and accounts 0.697 
   
Principal Component No. 17 67. Risk management committee (RMC) 0.853 
 68. Terms of reference of RMC 0.786 
 69. Membership of RMC 0.739 
 49. Reviewing risk management systems -0.667 
   
Principal Component No. 18 51. Membership of AC 0.932 
 48. Existence of AC 0.932 
 77. Internal control policy and procedure 0.681 
   
Principal Component No. 19 63. Evaluation of individual members 0.857 
 62. Evaluation of chairperson  0.849 
 70. Composition of RMC 0.452 
   
Principal Component No. 20 55. Individual members’ attendance of AC meetings 0.870 
 56. Attendance of the majority of AC meetings 0.860 
   
Principal Component No. 21 66. Policy of risk management 0.740 
 53. Chairperson independence of AC 0.566 
 54. Frequency of AC meeting  0.544 
 50. Terms of reference of AC 0.489 
Continuation: Appendix 2, Loadings on individual corporate governance provisions for each of the 31 components 
Principal Component (Factor) CGI items: information on or reference to Loading 
value 
Principal Component No. 22 57. External auditor’s scope and responsibility  0.714 
 64. Actual and potential risks -0.542 
   
Remuneration Sub-Index 
Principal Component No. 23 
 
101. All directors’ remuneration by name 
 
0.890 
 103. Directors’ remuneration philosophy 0.860 
 82. Existence of RC 0.837 
 95. NEDs’ remuneration 0.836 
 94. All directors’ cash remuneration 0.836 
 83. Membership of RC 0.804 
   
Principal Component No. 24 93. Other directors’ remuneration 0.905 
 92. CEO’s remuneration 0.905 
 96. All directors’ non-cash remuneration 0.862 
 102. Directors’ long-term incentive plan  0.554 
   
Principal Component No. 25 85. Chairperson independence of RC 0.792 
 84. Composition of RC 0.740 
 91. Terms of reference  0.696 
 86. Frequency of RC meetings 0.571 
 100. Remuneration consultants 0.496 
   
Principal Component No. 26 87. Individual members’ attendance of RC meetings 0.938 
 90. Evaluation of individual members 0.931 
 99. Composition of NEDs’ remuneration 0.429 
   
Principal Component No. 27 88. Attendance of the majority of RC meetings 0.992 
 89. Evaluation of chairperson 0.992 
   
Principal Component No. 28 111. AC chairman attendance of AGM 0.928 
 110. RC chairman attendance of AGM 0.918 
 109. NC chairman attendance of AGM 0.917 
 107. Names of board member attend AGM 0.908 
 108. Board chairman attendance of AGM 0.823 
 112. RMC chairman attendance of AGM 0.432 
Relations with Shareholder Sub-Index 
Principal Component No. 29 
 
115. Obligations to society/community 
 
0.794 
 116. Environmental issues 0.776 
 117. Social issues 0.714 
 118. Employee training and education programmes 0.702 
 119. Health and safety 0.685 
   
Principal Component No. 30 114. Proxy voting policy  0.670 
 113. Shareholder activism 0.593 
 120. Code of ethics 0.562 
 105. Notice on annual general meetings (AGMs) 0.557 
   
Principal Component No. 31 104. Obligations to shareholders 0.872 
 106. Disclosure of shareholders’ rights 0.577 
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Table 1 
Sample selection procedures 
Panel A:  classification of non-financial listed firms on the LSE as of 31/12/2013 Number of firms from 
each industry  
Basic materials  72 
Consumer goods  76 
Consumer series   131 
Technology   44 
Industrials   179 
Healthcare   28 
Communication   26 
Oil and gas  56 
Firms available for sampling   612 
Less: Firms with no annual reports 66  
         Firms listed recently (2008-2013) 125  
         Firms with some annual reports missing 128 319 
Firms with full data  293 
Panel B: classification of non-financial listed firms with full data  Number of firms from 
each industry 
Basic materials  27 
Consumer goods  36 
Consumer series   68 
Technology   22 
Industrials   102 
Healthcare   15 
Communication   5 
Oil and gas  18 
Firms with full data  293 
 
Panel C: The final selected sample 
Number of firms 
from each 
industry 
Final stratified sample 
Basic materials and oil and gas 45 20 
Consumer goods 36 20 
Consumer series and healthcare 83 20 
Industrials 102 20 
Technology and communication 27 20 
 293 100 
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Table 2 
Summary definition of variables 
Variables Definition  
CEOP Natural log of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash 
remuneration) and total non-cash (i.e., performance share plan and any 
other reported LTIPs) remuneration of CEOs. 
CFOP Natural log of annual cash (i.e. cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash 
remuneration) and total non-cash (i.e. performance share plan and any 
other reported LTIPs) remuneration of CFOs. 
AEDP Natural log of annual cash (i.e. cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash 
remuneration) and total non-cash (i.e. performance share plan and any 
other reported LTIPs) remuneration of AEDs scaled by the total number 
of executive directors. To account for potential size effects, we run median 
regressions. 
TSR Total share return obtained by adding capital gain (closing share price 
minus opening share price divided by opening share price) and dividend 
yield (dividend per share divided by opening share price). 
Q Book value of total assets minus equity’s market and book values scaled 
by book total assets. 
ROA Operating profit divided by total assets. 
CGI UK corporate governance (CG) index constituting 120 CG provisions 
extracted from the CG Code of 2010. Each CG provision of the constructed 
index is awarded a value of 1 if disclosure is made in firms’ 
accounts/reports and 0 otherwise. This then is scaled to a value ranging 
from 100% to 0%. Principal component analysis is then applied to obtain 
31 key components out of the 120 individual corporate governance 
provisions. 
P*CGI Interaction variable between performance (i.e., TSR or Q or ROA) and 
CGI. 
BSE Natural log of the number of inside and outside executives on a corporate 
board. 
BD Percentage of ethnic minorities and females on a corporate board. 
DSPLIT 1 if CEO and chairperson positions are separated, 0 otherwise. 
CEOT Total number of years an individual remained in the CEO position within 
a firm. 
CEOS Total CEO pay scaled by total of all other executive directors’ pay. 
MANO Proportion of all directors’ ownership to total company ordinary 
shareholdings. 
ISTO Proportion of institutional ownership to total company ordinary 
shareholdings. 
BLKO Proportion of block ownership (at least own 3% to total company ordinary 
shareholdings). 
AFS 1, if a company is audited by one of the biggest four audit firms 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte and Touche, Ernst and Young and 
KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
LTA Natural log of book total assets. 
CEX Total capital expenditure scaled by total assets. 
RIS Total research and development expenditure scaled by total assets. 
SG Percentage of the sales of this year minus the sales of previous year to the 
sales of the previous year. 
CL Takes 1 if a firm is listed in a foreign market, 0 otherwise. 
  IDU Dummy variables for each of the five main industries. 
  YDU Dummy variables for the years 2008-2013. 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics and percentage of variation explained by each of 31 components of the CGI 
Component  Percent Explained  SD Mean Median 
Leadership Sub-Index’s Components   
C1 31.08 0.24 0.89 1.00 
C2 15.85 0.31 0.65 0.50 
C3 14.25 0.25 -0.25 -0.50 
Effectiveness Sub-Index’s Components   
C4 16.56 0.37 0.67 0.89 
C5 11.41 0.30 0.84 1.00 
C6 6.92 0.22 0.10 0.00 
C7 6.71 0.21 0.92 1.00 
C8 6.07 0.37 0.61 0.67 
C9 5.32 0.33 0.35 0.33 
C10 5.29 0.084 0.007 0.00 
C11 5.16 0.17 0.96 1.00 
C12 4.15 0.34 0.43 0.50 
C13 4.04 0.30 0.028 0.00 
Accountability Sub-Index’s Components   
C14 14.65 0.13 0.019 0.00 
C15 10.29 0.31 0.56 0.63 
C16 8.24 0.19 0.94 1.00 
C17 8.14 0.25 -0.14 -0.25 
C18 7.64 0.11 0.98 1.00 
C19 7.42 0.14 0.030 0.00 
C20 6.54 0.38 0.81 1.00 
C21 5.83 0.23 0.82 1.00 
C22 3.62 0.22 -0.047 0.00 
Remuneration Sub-Index’s Components   
C23 21.87 0.12 0.98 1.00 
C24 16.25 0.29 0.87 1.00 
C25 13.04 0.26 0.77 0.80 
C26 9.95 0.32 0.82 1.00 
C27 9.45 0.20 0.040 0.00 
Relations with Shareholders Sub-Index’s Components  
C28 26.39 0.35 0.24 0.00 
C29 18.26 0.33 0.72 0.80 
C30 11.30 0.29 0.75 0.75 
C31 8.46 0.25 0.89 1.00 
Notes: Principal component analysis is conducted for our five sub-indices in order to identify 
the most relevant corporate governance provisions that contribute to the observed effect of the 
governance index, where we retain all components with an eigenvalue greater than one. We 
also retain all corporate governance provisions with loading values exceeding 0.40. This 
resulted in retaining 31 components that account for 68.04% of the total variance in our 
original data. To compute the score of our index, we use the average equal-weighted sum of 
the corporate governance provisions associated with each component, with the exception of 
components number 3, 13, 17 and 22, which have substitute provisions. The provisions of 
these components are calculated as follows to reflect the substitutability: the component 3 is 
calculated as the sum of the roles of the board and management less board membership, 
divided by two. Component number 13 is computed as the sum of frequency of nomination 
committee (NC) meetings and board composition minus access to free independent legal 
advice, divided by three. The same approach is followed to compute the remaining two 
components. 
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Table 4 
Summary statistics 
Variable  Mean  Median SD Min Max 
Panel A - CEO pay (£m) 
CEO_salary  0.56 0.40 0.40 0.0009 2.12 
CEO_bonus 0.75 0.52 0.77 0.0006 3.65 
CEO_cash 1.57 0.68 3.07 0.020 36.65 
CEO_non-cash 1.98 0.46 3.73 0.003 29.92 
Total CEO pay (CEOP) 3.55 1.14 6.15 0.020 61.44 
 
Panel B - CFO pay (£m) 
CFO_salary 0.36 0.29 0.23 0.015 1.82 
CFO_bonus 0.39 0.30 0.34 0.005 1.85 
CFO_cash 0.81 0.56 0.82 0.017 7.07 
CFO_non-cash 0.95 0.38 1.44 0.0009 12.31 
Total CFO pay (CFOP) 1.76 0.94 2.04 0.029 15.28 
 
Panel C - All other executive directors pay (£m) 
AED_salary 1.36 0.92 1.21 0.003 9.80 
ADE_bonus 1.56 0.94 1.90 0.002 13.66 
AED_cash 3.50 1.66 5.44 0.065 58.85 
AED_non-cash 4.03 1.08 6.59 0.011 46.73 
Total AED pay (AEDP) 7.53 2.74 11.19 0.065 105.58 
 
Panel D - Firm performance variables 
TSR 0.086 0.039 0.396 -0.605 0.916 
Q 0.54 0.56 0.24 0.014 1.66 
ROA 0.086 0.077 0.097 -0.137 0.299 
Panel E - Corporate governance disclosure index 
CGI % 52.42 54.69 12.49 17.00 81.00 
 
Panel F - Board characteristics (control variables) 
BSE 9.00 8.00 3.46 3.00 18.00 
BD % 11.65 11.11 11.40 0.00 50.00 
Panel G – CEO Power (control variables)     
DSPLIT % 90.33 100.00 29.57 0.00 100.00 
CEOT 5.54 4.00 5.21 0.00 35.00 
CEOS 0.48 0.476 0.18 0.08 1.00 
Panel H - Ownership structure (control variables) 
MANO % 5.95 0.58 11.40 0.005 52.37 
ISTO % 38.38 36.38 20.70 3.07 97.49 
BLKO % 42.62 43.20 21.55 3.07 98.08 
Panel I - Firm-characteristics (control variables) 
AFS % 82.00 100.00 38.45 0.00 100.00 
TA (£m) 177,43.64 431.25 418,59.28 0.983 274,507.71 
CEX % 4.99 3.70 4.14 0.42 14.73 
RIS 0.07 0.024 0.14 0.00 1.24 
SG % 7.61 5.65 18.60 -23.77 52.04 
CL % 70.00 100.00 45.86 0.00 100.00 
Notes: The table reports summary descriptive statistics relating to annual cash-based (bonus, salary, and other 
cash payments) and equity-based (i.e., performance share plan and any other LTIPs) pay for CEOs, CFOs, and 
all other executive directors (AEDs) in Panels A-C.  The descriptive statistic for alterative accounting (ROA) and 
market-based (TSR and Q) measures for corporate performance provided in Panel D. Additionally, descriptive 
statistics for corporate governance disclosure index (CGI) are provided in Panel E. Finally, Panels F, G and H 
provide the descriptive statistics for control variables as follows: Panel F presents the statistical summary of board 
mechanisms, namely board size (BSE), board gender and ethnic diversity (BD), separation of CEO and 
chairperson positions (DSPLIT), CEO tenure (CEOT), and CEO slice (CEOS); Panel G shows the descriptive 
statistics for ownership variables, namely managerial ownership (MANO), institutional ownership (ISTO) and 
block ownership (BLKO), whilst Panel H provides the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics including audit 
firm size (AFS), firm size (TA), capital expenditure (CEX), risk taking (RIS), sales growth (SG) and cross-listing 
(CL). 
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Table 5 
Bivariate correlations 
Variable CGI BSE BD DSPLIT CEOT CEOS CL AFS MANO ISTO BLKO LTA CEX RIS SG ROA TSR Q CEOP CFOP AEDP 
CGI  .480*** .374*** .312*** -.093** .082* .517*** .523*** -.618*** -.260*** -.507*** .527*** .107*** -.207*** .069* .236*** 0.114*** .239*** .617*** .584*** .534*** 
BSE .440***  .381*** .011 -.005 -.221*** .512*** .177*** -.619*** -.313*** -.541*** .809*** .121*** -.310*** .089** .310*** 0.033 .220*** .696*** .730*** .613*** 
BD .326*** .335***  -.089** .000 -.005 .172*** .032 -.367*** -.255*** -.364*** .418*** .126*** -.194*** -.007 .247*** -0.095** .151*** .470*** .511*** .456*** 
DSPLIT .307*** .016 -.072*  -.019 .011 .020 .273*** -.120*** .020 .009 -.036 -.002 -.086* .004 -.031 0.017 -.118*** -.031 -.074* -.039 
CEOT -.167*** -.045 -.054 -.074*  .064 -.112*** -.009 .126*** -.059 -.018 -.017 .094** -.172*** .085** .173*** 0.115*** -.070* .042 -.016 .052 
CEOS .070* -.209*** .031 -.005 .063  -.042 .178*** -.114*** .154*** .122*** -.050 .145*** -.061 .008 .134*** 0.030 -.047 .181*** .023 -.027 
CL .482*** .507*** .169*** .020 -.162*** -.057  .244*** -.530*** -.288*** -.405*** .533*** .241*** .075 .079* .268*** 0.058 .090** .518*** .515*** .480*** 
AFS .558*** .195*** .021 .273*** -.087** .167*** .224***  -.265*** -.009 -.234*** .166*** .060 .081 .005 .013 0.017 .124*** .309*** .234*** .243*** 
MANO -.420*** -.361*** -.043 -.194*** .055 -.083* -.376*** -.326***  .159*** .466*** -.754*** -.156*** .308*** -.036 -.333*** -0.033 -.297*** -.749*** -.740*** -.689*** 
ISTO -.265*** -.266*** -.225*** .017 .010 .132*** -.251*** -.043 .025  .748*** -.260*** .019 .010 -.100** -.157*** -0.136*** -.166*** -.321*** -.372*** -.322*** 
BLKO -.474*** -.517*** -.349*** .011 .078* .106** -.377*** -.255*** .291*** .722***  -.531*** .002 .116** -.095** -.245*** -0.097** -.233*** -.620*** -.642*** -.606*** 
LTA .453*** .809*** .388*** -.031 -.047 -.044 .525*** .151*** -.446*** -.209*** -.493***  .189*** -.487*** .128*** .504*** 0.093** .268*** .861*** .876*** .779*** 
CEX .076* .096** .097** -.018 .023 .155*** .208*** .045 -.028 .086** .091** .151***  -.252*** .103** .225*** -0.048 -.111*** .157*** .212*** .102** 
RIS -.028 -.136*** -.186*** .012 -.154*** -.096* .150*** .071 .048 .100* .133*** -.326*** -.125**  -.090* -.328*** -0.041 -.209*** -.349*** -.366*** -.284*** 
SG .028 .091** -.029 -.001 .034 .003 .071* -.012 .004 -.057 -.045 .109*** .102** -.063  .277*** 0.008 -.019 .121*** .131*** .118*** 
ROA .147*** .297*** .239*** -.053 .162*** .119*** .218*** -.010 -.078* -.093** -.187*** .512*** .161*** -.412*** .216***  0.243*** .067 .487*** .484*** .430*** 
TSR .073* .014 .067 -.006 .078* .035 .052 .016 -.011 -.094** -.058 .066 -.073* -.087* -.014 .222***  -0.014 0.157*** 0.158*** 0.156*** 
Q .233*** .190*** .104** -.121*** -.028 -.042 .099** .148*** -.256*** -.178*** -.207*** .251*** -.106*** -.263*** -.051 .083** -0.044  .298*** .220*** .293*** 
CEOP .580*** .693*** .443*** -.026 .000 .202*** .476*** .312*** -.534*** -.302*** -.610*** .852*** .073* -.222*** .084** .456*** 0.125*** .293***  .937*** .953*** 
CFOP .546*** .724*** .488*** -.082* -.064 .012 .503*** .234*** -.470*** -.342*** -.630*** .874*** .109** -.254*** .114** .468***    0.125*** .233*** .931***  .925*** 
AEDP .456*** .753*** .445*** -.034 -.007 -.026 .443*** .238*** -.505*** -.287*** -.559*** .775*** .019 -.188*** .080* .398*** 0.119*** .280*** .951*** .926***  
Notes:  The upper right half of the table provides the coefficients relating to Spearman’s correlation, whilst the bottom left half of the table presents the coefficients relating to Pearson’s correlation. CGI denotes the corporate governance disclosure 
index;  BSE denotes board size; BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity;   DSPLIT denotes separation of CEO and chairperson positions; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEOS denotes CEO pay slice; CL denotes cross-listing ; AFS denotes audit 
firm size ; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership;  LTA denotes firm size; CEX denotes capital expenditure;  RIS denotes risk; SG denotes sales growth; TSR denotes total 
shareholder return; ROA denotes return on assets; Q denotes Tobin’s Q; CEOP, CFOP and AEDP denote  natural log of total CEOs, CFOs and all other executive directors pay, respectively. ***, **, and* indicate that correlation is significant at the 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively 
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Table 6 
Effect of corporate governance structure on CEOs’ pay (CEOP) 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
Annual_Cash 
(1) 
Annual_Non-cash 
(2) 
Total 
(3) 
VIF 
 
Corporate governance index: 
CGI -1.199(.000)*** -2.578(.003)*** -2.026(.000)*** 3.060 
 
Board structure: 
BSE 0.282(.025)** -0.157(.648) 0.385(.008)*** 3.287 
BD -0.025(.913) 1.518(.016)** -0.352(.182) 1.630 
 
CEO power: 
DSPLIT -0.438(.000)*** 0.255(.348) -0.050(.654) 1.494 
CEOT 0.007(.150) 0.057(.000)*** 0.029(.000)*** 1.233 
CEOS 1.250(.000)*** 2.674(.000)**** 2.065(.000)*** 1.344 
 
Ownership structure: 
MANO -1.631(.000)*** -1.994(.106) -2.365(.000)*** 2.343 
ISTO 0.080(.649) 0.249(.599) 0.089(.655) 2.537 
BLKO -0.241(.275) -1.575(.010)*** -0.592(.019)** 3.807 
 
Controls:  
AFS 0.000(.955) 0.013(.000)*** 0.002(.056)* 1.864 
LTA 0.299(.000)*** 0.497(.000)*** 0.373(.000)*** 5.834 
CEX -0.776(.189) 1.742(.279) 0.621(.356) 1.244 
RIS 0.728(.000)*** 1.338(.012)** 1.032(.000)*** 1.735 
SG 0.127(.356) 0.239(.522) 0.250(.112) 1.224 
CL 0.225(.001)*** 0.139(.585) 0.113(.159) 1.941 
IDU YES YES YES - 
YDU YES YES YES - 
Constant 7.451*** 2.341** 5.897*** - 
Durbin-W. Stat. 2.175 2.147 2.171 - 
F- value 109.465*** 39.181*** 128.614*** - 
Adj. R2 0.883 0.731 0.899 - 
No. of observations 600 600 600 - 
Notes: CGI denotes the corporate governance disclosure index; BSE denotes board size; BD denotes 
board gender and ethnic diversity; DSPLIT denotes separation of CEO and chairperson positions; 
CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEOS denotes CEO pay slice; MANO denotes managerial ownership; 
ISTO denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; AFS denotes audit firm size; 
LTA denotes firm size; CEX denotes capital expenditure; RIS denotes risk; SG denotes sales growth; 
CL denotes cross-listing; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies. P-values 
are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 7 
Effect of corporate governance structure on CFOs and all other executive directors’ (AEDs) pay 
 CFO Pay (CFOP) AED Pay (AEDP) 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
Annual_Cash 
(1) 
Annual_Non-cash 
(2) 
Total 
(3) 
VIF Annual_Cash 
(4) 
Annual_Non-cash 
(5) 
Total 
(6) 
VIF 
 
Corporate governance index: 
CGI -0.976(.004)*** -2.065(.057)* -1.454(.001)*** 2.849 -1.314(.000)*** -2.451(.002)*** -1.971(.000)*** 3.060 
 
Board structure: 
BSE 0.017(.900) -1.025(.017)** -0.032(.855) 5.363 -0.512(.000)*** -1.141(.000)*** -0.529(.000)*** 3.287 
BD -0.041(.869) 2.008(.011)** 0.411(.211) 1.692 0.158(.447) 1.494(.010)*** 0.392(.145) 1.630 
 
CEO power: 
DSPLIT -0.093(.384) 0.146(.671) 0.121(.386) 1.587 -0.334(.000)*** 0.216(.385) -0.025(.829) 1.494 
CEOT 0.010(.070)* 0.068(.000)*** 0.025(.001)*** 1.273 0.007(.127) 0.057(.000)*** 0.028(.000)*** 1.233 
CEOS 0.213(.190) -0.627(.227) 0.043(.841) 1.286 -0.389(.004)*** 0.372(.315) 0.003(.988) 1.344 
 
Ownership structure: 
MANO -0.871(.092)* 0.159(.922) -1.160(.087)* 1.927 -1.605(.000)*** -2.024(.072)* -2.287(.000)*** 2.343 
ISTO 0.193(.309) 1.513(.012)** 0.425(.084)* 2.602 0.012(.940) 0.417(.335) 0.050(.807) 2.537 
BLKO -0.126(.597) -1.509(.050)** -0.368(.263) 3.967 -0.360(.071)* -1.641(.003)*** -0.641(.013)** 3.807 
 
Controls:  
AFS -0.002(.075)* 0.010(.016)** 0.000(.909) 1.775 0.000(.740) 0.013(.000)*** 0.003(.056)* 1.864 
LTA 0.308(.000)*** 0.485(.000)*** 0.363(.000)*** 6.748 0.285(.000)*** 0.480(.000)*** 0.359(.000)*** 5.834 
CEX -1.238(.054)* 0.151(.941) -0.227(.785) 1.261 -0.659(.216) 2.208(.134) 0.795(.248) 1.244 
RIS 0.835(.000)*** -0.024(.974) 0.470(.115) 1.751 0.829(.000)*** 1.396(.004)*** 1.031(.000)*** 1.735 
SG 0.056(.709) 0.463(.325) 0.188(.334) 1.223 0.137(.268) 0.183(.593) 0.254(.114) 1.224 
CL 0.198(.009)*** 0.842(.001)*** 0.311(.002)*** 1.765 0.146(.022)** 0.073(.681) 0.081(.321) 1.941 
IDU YES YES YES - YES YES YES - 
YDU YES YES YES - YES YES YES - 
Constant 7.490*** 4.416*** 6.765*** - 8.945*** 4.569*** 7.755*** - 
Durbin-W. Stat. 2.016 2.117 2.088 - 2.075 2.173 2.129 - 
F- value 64.261*** 16.884*** 55.479*** - 68.632*** 29.361*** 66.803*** - 
Adj. R2 0.824 0.544 0.801 - 0.825 0.668 0.821 - 
No. of observations 600 600 600 - 600 600 600 - 
Notes: CGI denotes the corporate governance disclosure index; BSE denotes board size; BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity; DSPLIT denotes separation of CEO and 
chairperson positions; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEOS denotes CEO pay slice; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes 
block ownership; AFS denotes audit firm size; LTA denotes firm size; CEX denotes capital expenditure; RIS denotes risk; SG denotes sales growth; CL denotes cross-listing; 
IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies. P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 8 
Effect of corporate governance structure on total CEOs, CFOs and all other executive directors’ (AEDs) 
 Good-governed firms Poorly-governed firms 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
CEO Total Pay 
(1) 
CFO Total Pay 
(2) 
AED Total Pay 
(3) 
CEO Total Pay 
(4) 
CFO Total Pay 
(5) 
AED Total Pay 
(6) 
 
Corporate governance index: 
CGI -1.800(.001)*** -1.152(.006)*** -1.810(.001)*** -1.592(.220) -0.820(.637) -1.930(.149) 
 
Board structure: 
BSE 0.177(.286) -0.049(.804) 0.234(.169) 0.173(.667) -1.118(.047)** 0.445(.285) 
BD 0.068(.814) 0.186(.595) 0.118(.691) 0.406(.712) 0.922(.537) 0.641(.571) 
 
CEO power: 
DSPLIT 0.131(.409) 0.063(.755) 0.156(.338) -0.347(.140) 0.148(.576) -0.290(.229) 
CEOT 0.033(.000)*** 0.031(.000)*** 0.033(.000)*** -0.003(.884) -0.005(.817) 0.000(.986) 
CEOS 1.834(.000)*** 0.094(.683) -0.198(.298) 2.907(.000)*** -0.143(.852) 0.525(.405) 
 
Ownership structure:  
MANO -2.643(.000)*** -1.781(.039)** -2.581(.000)*** -3.241(.001)*** -0.985(.435) -3.440(.000)*** 
ISTO 0.306(.151) 0.463(.069)* 0.255(.242) -1.161(.219) 0.336(.805) -0.880(.362) 
BLKO -0.375(.072)* -0.057(.861) -0.392(.163) 0.523(.715) 0.254(.895) 0.269(.855) 
 
Controls: 
AFS -0.047(.704) -0.026(.865) -0.059(.639) -0.367(.128) -1.046(.003)*** -0.350(.157) 
LTA 0.416(.000)*** 0.379(.000)*** 0.410(.000)*** 0.362(.000)*** 0.432(.001)*** 0.311(.001)*** 
CEX 0.827(.269) -0.675(.459) 0.987(.199) -2.977(.240) -2.206(.454) -3.231(.215) 
RIS 1.216(.000)*** 0.749(.024)** 1.239(.000)*** -0.139(.862) -0.425(.657) -0.409(.617) 
SG 0.388(.038)** 0.321(.162) 0.401(.036)** -0.398(.207) -0.405(.251) -0.418(.197) 
CL 0.012(.902) 0.227(.053)* -0.020(.843) 0.284(.226) 0.690(.016)** 0.351(.148) 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 5.448*** 6.391*** 7.242*** 6.985*** 8.249*** 9.432*** 
Durbin-W. Stat. 2.106 2.165 2.134 1.916 2.086 1.916 
F- value 84.309*** 42.042*** 79.051*** 54.995*** 21.627*** 46.599*** 
Adj. R2 0.876 0.783 0.868 0.974 0.907 0.970 
No. of observations 447 447 447 153 153 153 
Notes: CGI denotes the corporate governance disclosure index; BSE denotes board size; BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity; DSPLIT denotes 
separation of CEO and chairperson positions; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEOS denotes CEO pay slice; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO 
denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; AFS denotes audit firm size; LTA denotes firm size; CEX denotes capital expenditure; 
RIS denotes risk; SG denotes sales growth; CL denotes cross-listing; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies. P-values are 
between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 
Pay-for-performance relationship 
 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
CEO Pay (CEOP) CFO Pay (CFOP) AED Pay (AEDP) 
Annual_Cash 
(1) 
Annual_Non-cash 
(2) 
Total 
(3) 
Annual_Cash 
(4) 
Annual_Non-cash 
(5) 
Total 
(6) 
Annual_Cash 
(7) 
Annual_Non-cash 
(8) 
Total 
(9) 
Corporate performance:         
TSR 0.146(.021)** 0.455(.011)** 0.242(.001)*** 0.142(.035)** 0.446(.038)** 0.197(.027)** 0.187(.001)*** 0.349(.034)** 0.247(.001)*** 
Controls:          
BSE 0.231(.066)* -0.134(.707) 0.358(.016)** -0.023(.867) 0.997(.022)** -0.066(.711) -0.545(.000)*** -1.140(.001)*** -0.558(.000)*** 
BD -0.408(.072)* 0.671(.297) -0.186(.487) -0.276(.257) 1.005(.201) -0.022(.946) -0.208(.310) 0.638(.281) -0.142(.601) 
DSPLIT -0.473(.000)*** -0.199(.454) -0.240(.026)** -0.093(.350) -0.053(.871) 0.056(.668) -0.410(.000)*** -0.189(.438) -0.207(.060)* 
CEOT 0.007(.165) 0.052(.000)*** 0.028(.000)*** 0.010(054)* 0.064(.000)*** 0.025(.000)*** 0.006(.162) 0.053(.000)*** 0.027(.000)*** 
CEOS 1.242(.000)*** 2.722(.000)*** 2.054(.000)*** 0.206(.198) -0.555(.288) 0.037(.863) -0.395(.003)*** 0.416(.276) -0.006(.971) 
MANO -1.524(.000)*** -2.524(.031)** -1.165(.002)*** -0.497(.302) -0428(.781) -0.925(.144) -1.404(.000)*** -2.663(.013)** -2.112(.000)*** 
ISTO 0.112(.510) 0.493(.307) 0.155(.440) 0.190(303) 1.859(.002)*** 0.505(.036)** 0.043(.781) 0.653(.141) 0.119(.561) 
BLKO -0.190(.368) -1.844(.003)*** -0.614(.018)** -0.060(.798) -1.837(.016)** -0.377(.216) -0.330(.097)* -1.891(.001)*** -0.659(.013)** 
AFS -0.343(.000)*** 0.117(.608) 0.285(.003)*** -0.355(.000)*** -0.274(.389) -0.378(.001)*** -0.291(.000)*** 0.059(.780) -0.283(.004)*** 
LTA 0.297(.000)*** 0.476(.000)*** 0.357(.000)*** 0.302(.000)*** 0.470(.000)*** 0.353(.000)*** 0.278(.000)*** 0.463(.000)*** 0.345(.000)*** 
CEX -0.769(.187) 2.714(.101) 0.719(.296) -1.249(.050)** 1.511(.461) -0.051(.951) -0.607(.251) 3.027(.047)** 0.916(.192) 
RIS 0.718(.000)*** 1.397(.010)*** 0.998(.000)*** 0.813(.000)*** 0.086(.904) 0.453(.123) 0.815(.000)*** 1.438(.004)*** 1.005(.000)*** 
SG 0.052(.699) 0.049(.898) 0.125(.436) 0.000(.998) 0.328(.491) 0.108(.577) 0.049(.692) 0.023(.948) 0.129(.429) 
CL 0.170(.013)** 0.077(.706) 0.029(.722) 0.156(.035)** 0.825(.001)*** 0.257(.008)*** 0.087(.163) 0.015(.936) -0.001(.988) 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 7.314*** 2.872(.000)*** 5.882*** 7.247*** 4.911*** 6.674*** 8.822*** 5.108*** 7.735*** 
Durbin-W. Stat. 2.175 2.177 2.219 2.004 2.135 2.116 2.085 2.239 2.207 
F- value 112.879*** 36.483*** 123.112*** 66.190*** 16.595*** 56.640*** 69.993*** 26.632*** 64.234*** 
Adj. R2 0.886 0.716 0.895 0.828 0.540 0.804 0.828 0.645 0.815 
No. of observations 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 
Notes: TSR denotes total shareholder return; BSE denotes board size; BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity; DSPLIT denotes separation of CEO and chairperson positions; CEOT denotes 
CEO tenure; CEOS denotes CEO pay slice; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; AFS denotes audit firm size; LTA denotes 
firm size; CEX denotes capital expenditure; RIS denotes risk; SG denotes sales growth; CL denotes cross-listing; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies. P-values are 
between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 
The moderating role of firm-level corporate governance  
 CEO Pay (CEOP) CFO Pay (CFOP) AED Pay (AEDP) 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
Total  
(1) 
Total 
(2) 
Total 
 (3) 
Total 
(4) 
Total 
(5) 
Total 
(6) 
Total  
(7) 
Total 
(8) 
Total 
(9) 
 
Corporate performance: 
  TSR 0.466(.003)*** - - 0.583(.001)*** - - 0.416(.006)*** - - 
  Q - 2.119(.005)*** - - 2.723(.006)*** - - 1.827(.019)** - 
  ROA - - 6.367(.002)*** - - 7.036(.005)*** - - 5.154(.011)** 
 
Corporate governance index: 
  CGI 0.014(.976) 0.183(.792) 0.306(.573) 0.814(.122) 1.224(.208) 0.997(.133) 0.012(.980) 0.289(.683) 0.111(.839) 
 
Interaction variable: 
   P*CGI -0.570(.010)*** -4.022(.002)*** -6.722(.003)*** -0.918(.020)** -5.460(.001)*** -8.061(.006)*** -0.497(.064)* -3.639(.007)*** -4.679(.005)*** 
 
Controls: 
 BSE 1.977(.000)*** -0.314(.029)** -1.806(.000)*** 1.475(.000)*** -0.173(.327) -1.361(.000)*** 0.989(.000)*** -0.603(.000)*** -0.821(.000)*** 
 BD 0.645(.064)* 0.426(.107) 0.739(.019)** 0.611(.120) 0.602(.066)* 0.758(.040)** 0.636(.068)* 0.485(.072)* 0.768(.015)** 
DSPLIT -0.407(.006)*** 0.038(.744) 0.394(.004)*** -0.219(.191) 0.212(.144) 0.240(.126) -0.374(.012)** 0.044(.713) 0.361(.008)*** 
CEOT 0.024(.002)*** 0.026(.000)*** 0.015(.027)** 0.019(.028)** 0.021(.003)*** 0.009(.067)* 0.021(.006)*** 0.025(.000)*** 0.014(.053)* 
CEOS 2.694(.000)*** 1.981(.000)*** 2.164(.000)*** 0.601(.019)** -0.063(.765) -0.188(.450) 0.597(.007)*** -0.076(.660) 0.084(.686) 
 MANO -3.714(.000)*** -2.090(.000)*** -2.565(.000)*** -2.320(.004)*** -0.768(.251) -1.547(.049)** -3.655(.000)*** -2.042(.000)*** -2561(.000)*** 
 ISTO 0.465(.071)* 0.145(.464) 0.369(.114) 0.661(.021)** 0.505(.037)** 0.713(.009)*** 0.418(.105) 0.103(.610) 0.300(.200) 
 BLKO -2.146(.000)*** -0.623(.013)** -1.769(.000)*** -1.816(.000)*** -0.394(.196) -1.530(.000)*** -2.137(.000)*** -0.665(.009)*** -1.754(.000)*** 
 AFS 0.128(.290) 0.002(.127) 0.006(.355) -0.045(.748) 0.000(.851) 0.004(.043)** 0.114(.348) 0.002(.121) 0.006(.000)*** 
 LTA 0.087(.000)*** 0.386(.000)*** 0.004(.000)*** 0.116(.000)*** 0.389(.000)*** 0.001(.000)*** 0.134(.005)*** 0.375(.000)*** 0.000(.000)*** 
 CEX 0.598(.500) 0.757(.256) 0.381(.820) 0.146(.883) 0.025(.975) 0.390(.677) 0.829(.351) 0.923(.176) 0.569(.485) 
 RIS 0.188(.476) 0.909(.000)*** 0.018(.638) 0.777(.016)** 0.227(.449) 0.143(.661) 0.141(.591) 0.901(.000)*** 0.284(.269) 
 SG 0.004(.983) 0.214(.169) 0.032(.867) 0.008(.971) 0.158(.407) 0.091(.686) 0.012(.955) 0.217(.173) -0.022(.910) 
 CL 0.336(.001)*** 0125(.116) 0.293(.002)*** 0.493(.000)*** 0.335(.001)*** 0.453(.000)*** 0.296(.004)*** 0.092(.254) 0.262(.002)*** 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 9.736*** 4.822*** 8.940*** 10.523*** 5.286*** 9.791*** 11.620*** 6.804*** 10.851*** 
Durbin-W. Stat. 2.096 2.116 2.098 2.138 2.111 2.090 2.096 2.079 2.116 
F- value 62.953*** 122.275*** 81.823*** 32.715 54.137*** 39.576*** 32.388*** 63.531*** 42.366*** 
Adj. R2 0.830 0.902 0.850 0.726 0.810 0.741 0.712 0.825 0.744 
No. of observations 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 
Notes:  CGI denotes the corporate governance index; P*CGI denotes the interaction variable between the CGI and each corporate performance proxies; TSR denotes total shareholder return; Q denotes 
Tobin’s Q; ROA denotes return on assets; BSE denotes board size; BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity;  DSPLIT denotes separation of CEO and chairperson positions; CEOT denotes CEO 
tenure; CEOS denotes CEO pay slice; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; AFS denotes audit firm size; LTA denotes firm 
size; CEX denotes capital expenditure; RIS denotes risk; SG denotes sales growth; CL denotes cross-listing; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies 
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Table 11  
A summary of the findings and hypotheses  
Hypotheses Descriptions Results 
 
H1 
 
There is a statistically significant negative association between firm-
level corporate governance disclosure index score and executive pay. 
 
Accepted 
 
H2 
 
There is a statistically significant association between board structure 
and executive pay. 
 
Rejected  
 
H3 
 
There is a statistically significant association between CEO power and 
executive pay. 
 
Generally 
accepted 
 
H4 
 
There is a statistically significant association between ownership 
structure and executive pay. 
 
Generally 
accepted 
 
H5 
 
There is a statistically positive link between executive pay and 
performance (PPS). 
 
Accepted 
 
H6 
 
Corporate governance moderates the association between executive 
pay and performance, with the PPS being stronger in firms with good 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
Accepted 
 
